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Court 5, Case 7
15 July 47 -M1-1-ABG-Perrin (Schaefer)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of
the United States of America, against Wilhelm List, et al., Defendants,
sitting at Nurnberg[sic], Germany, on 15 July 1947, 0930-1630, Justice
Wennerstrum, presiding.
THE MARSHAL:

The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal 5.

Military Tribunal 5 is now in session.
America and this honorable Tribunal.

God save the United States of

THE PRESIDENT: This Tribunal is convened at this time for the purpose of
the presentation of the opening statements on behalf of the
prosecution. Prior to the presentation of this opening statement, I wish
to make a statement relative to certain motions which have been filed by
the defense counsel. These motions will receive the consideration of
this Tribunal following the presentation of the opening statements by the
prosecution. Is the prosecution ready?
GENERAL TAYLOR:
THE PRESIDENT:
GENERAL TAYLOR:

Yes, Your Honor.
You may proceed.
May it please Your Honors.

This is the first time, since the conclusion of the trial before the
International Military Tribunal, that high-ranking officers of the
Wehrmacht have appeared in this dock, charged with capital crimes
committed in a strictly military capacity. The conviction and execution
of Keitel and Jodl, pursuant to the judgement and sentence of the
International Military Tribunal, gave rise to wide-spread public comment,
not only in Germany, but also in the United States and England. Since
that time, there have been several other note-worthy trials of German
military leaders.
In the British zone of occupation, Generals von Falkenhorst and
Blumentritt have been tried for the murder of prisoners of war. General
Sepp Dietrich and his subordinates have been charged in the American zone
with responsibility for the Malmedy massacre. Generals von Mackensen and
Maeltzer faced a British military court in Italy in connection with the
Ardeatine caves massacre of Italians. In Yugoslavia and Greece, Generals
Alexander Loehr and Friedrich Wilheim Mueller have been tried
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and condemned for war crimes committed in southeastern Europe.
Most recently, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring was tried by a British
military court in Italy. The court found him guilty of responsibility
for the Ardeatine caves atrocity, as well as for other war crimes against
Italians commited[sic] by troops under his command in northern Italy. It
sentenced him to be shot to death. This sentence of capital punishment
against one of the outstanding military figures of the recent war again
stimulated much discussion, and encountered not inconsiderable criticism,
particularly in England. Whether or not as a result of such criticism,
about ten days ago the British reviewing authorities commuted the death
sentences against Kesselring, von Machensen, and Maeltzer to life
imprisonment.
Because of the unusually deep interest which cases of this type have
aroused, not only in military and legal circles but throughout the
general public, and because the scope and sweep of this case is much
greater than any of the previous cases to which I have referred, the
prosecution may fairly be required, in opening this case, to do much more
than outline the evidence which will be adduced in support of the
indictment. Indeed, as this case progresses, I think it will rapidly
appear that the evidentiary questions are of secondary importance. That
the killings charged in the indictment occurred, that they were carried
out by troops under the command of these defendants, and that they were
in fact ordered by the defendants will not, I believe, be denied. The
naked facts are terribly clear.
Nor, after the evidence is laid before you, can the true meaning of this
case be drawn from learned arguments by counsel, analyzing and refining
the laws of war as they are written in the Hague Conventions and in
textbooks on international law. Of necessity, we will hear much
discussion of hostages, and reprisals, and the necessary qualifications
of belligerent armed forces. But the exposition of these technical
problems of the law of land warfare, important as it may be, does not
reach to the heart of this or similar cases in the year 1947.
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The doubts which have been expressed concerning the wisdom and value of
trials such as this one arise from a variety of conseptions[sic] and
misconceptions. To some extent, these doubts are the natural result of
the passage of time. Hostilities in Europe ended over two years ago, the
devastated and stricken condition of Germany has aroused sympathy, and
there is general desire to wipe the unhappy past from memory. So we hear
it suggested by some that the present plight of Germany should shield men
such as these from the consequences of crime, if criminals they be. But
Germany is not only devastated and stricken land, and for every crime
there is not only a criminal but a victim. In the minds of many peoples
are memories so mordant that they can not be forgotten. If the course of
justice is stayed, these sores will only fester the longer and spread the
wider. We can not restore the moral fabric of Europe by laying a shroud
over unshriven and unburied corpses.
Other and quite different doubts have been raised by some who, with a
blurred vision of military discipline, suppose that military men are a
sort of race apart, who are not responsible for their actions because
they are expected to obey orders. But the law and code of the German
Army itself says that it is the duty of every soldier to refuse to obey
orders that he knows to be criminal. This may be hard for the ordinary
soldier.
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acting under pistol-point orders from his lieutenant. It is far less
difficult for high-ranking commanders such as the men in the dock. These
men are not named in the indictment because they are gererals[sic]; they
are named because they are charged with the responsibility for
crimes. They must be acquitted if, under the law and the evidence, that
responsibility can not justly be attributed to them, but they can not be
acquitted merely because they are generals, any more than they can be
indicted for that reason alone.
More fundamental and more cogent, I believe, are the doubts of those who
quesiton the wisdom and justice of attempting, by criminal prosecution,
to enforce the laws [of] war with meticulous precision. Wars, such
people say, are not fought on the dueling ground, and a polished
observance of ritual can not be expected. Furthermore, there is a
general feeling, not without substantial basis, that some of the laws of
war as written in the Hague Conventions are obsolete, and on both sides
were honored only in the breach. Then, too, it is felt, and rightly,
that violations of the laws of war are committed in the best regulated
armies, and it is therefore urged that the commanders should not be held
to a strict and rigorous account for occasional lapses. I think that the
unarticulated doubts of this latter description underlie the criticism
leveled against the death sentence which was imposed upon Kesselring,
particularly criticism emanated from high-ranking Allied commanders who
fought against him. The degree of Kesselring's guilt is, of course, not
at issue in this proceeding, but in the course of it we will of necessity
find occasion to draw certain comparisons and contrasts between the
charges which were laid against Kesselring and those which are laid
against the defendants here in the dock.
This case will achieve international meaning and significance, I believe,
only if we adopt a realistic and practical approach to such
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questions. And I believe that such an approach has been adopted in the
framing of this indictment, in the selection of evidence in support
thereof, and in the basic theory of the prosecution's case. The
prosecution fully recognizes that the laws and usages of warfare must be
altered and adapted to reflect the developments in this terrible act
which man has learned to practice with such appalling proficience. We
have not sought and wil[sic] not seek in this case to make murderers out
of soldiers for the violation of rules framed in 1907, if those rules
today are outmoded and generally disregarded.
So, too, the prosecution takes full account of the true nature of modern
warfare as it relates to the responsibilities of commanders. We would
not have arrested the defendants, we would not have requested that this
court be constituted, and we would not have brought charges against these
men, if they were to be accused of mere carelessness or responsibility
for occasional or sporadic crimes committed by their troops.
On the contrary, we charge that these men inaugurated and executed a
deliberate program of terror and extermination which was boundless in its
arrogant contempt for the inhabitants of the lands which the Wehrmacht
invaded and overran. It is perhaps the most elementary principle of
human intercourse--the bare subsistence level of civilization-- that
human life should not be destroyed needlessly, or merely because it is
regarded as inferior. This is not an elevated or noble principle,
although the entire structure of human dignity is built upon it. This
principle merely enunciates mankind's instinct of self-preservation, and
its observance protects man from self-destruction. It is so deeply
roted[sic] in civilization that the world insists on its observance in
war as well as in peace, and the laws of war are, essentially, nothing
more than a gloss on this fundamental rubric. It is for denying and
undermining the very basis of civi-
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lization that these men are indicted.
Let us turn, then, to the indictment in which the charges against these
men are set forth. Counts One and Two of the indictment relate to
murders and other crimes committed against the civilian inhabitants of
Greece, Yugoslavia, Norway and Albania during the German occupation of
those countries. Count Three charges the killing, in violation of the
rules of war, of prisonders of war and other members of the armed forces
of cuntries[sic] at war with Germany, and of members of the Italian armed
forces after Italy's capitulation to the Allied nations. Count Four
accuses the defendants of ordering and committing murders and other
crimes in furtherance of the "racial" and economic policies of the Third
Reich--the slaughter of Jews, the imprisonment and mistreatment of other
segments of the civilian population, and the deportation of thousands to
slave labor in Germany.
Count one, more particularly, charges the murder of many thousands of
civilians under the color of retaliation or "reprisal" for attacks on
German forces or military installations. As will appear from the
evidence, these killings were carried out pursuant to a plan and system,
embodied in orders issued, distributed, and executed by the defendants
and others, [which] called for the retaliatory killing of civilians at
arbitrarily established ratios, such as 100 civilians for every German
soldier killed, and 50 for each soldier wounded. Usually the Germans
referred to the victims of these mass executions as "hostages".
As I said at the outset, the proof of these acts will present no
difficulty. The evidence, is all set forth in orders, reports, and other
documents issued and circulated by the defendants themselves. Lest Your
Honors find it hard to credit what the written word so starkly exhibits,
the oral testimony of eyewitnesses will also be spread on the record.
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The laws of war do, of course, recognize that in certain circumstances
belligerents may take steps by way of reprisal. The taking of hostages,
too, has been practiced between nations since ancient times. The killing
of hostages is a much more recent development; it is not the emblem of an
enlightened way of life, and most of the precedents are found in the
history of the Germany army and its exploits during the First World
War. Furthermore, as will clearly appear, most of the victims who met
their death before German firing squads at Belgrade, or Kraljevo, or
Athens, or Klissura were not "hostages" in any true sense of the word.
We will, in due course, endeavor to set forth in some detail the rules of
war as they relate to "reprisals" and "hostages". At this point I wish
to make only two observations. Both the London Charter and Control
Council Law No. 10 declare the killing of hostages to be a violation of
the laws of war. This declaration is binding on the Tribunal and the
prosecution alike, and the prosecution believes that it is an accurate
statement of the law. But the theory of the prosecution's case under
Count One does not rest on this rule. We may concede for purposes of
argument that the execution of hostages may under some circumstances be
justified, harshly as those words may ring in our ears. But the law must
be spared the shame of condoning the torrent of senseless death which
these men, let loose in south-eastern Europe.
Count Two of the indictment speaks in terms of destruction and
devastation, totally unjustified by military necessity. Here, too, the
victims were the peoples of Norway, Ygoslavia[sic], Greece, and Albania,
who saw their homes in flames, their towns and villages erased and their
possiessions[sic] looted and scattered.
Count Three of the indictment is quite different from the first two
counts. The victims of the crimes charged in Count Three were
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not civilians and non-combatants; they were, for the most part, members
of the Yugoslav and Greek armed forces who continued to resist the German
invader after the defeat of the major units of the Greek and Yugoslav
armies and the replacement of their national governments by "puppet"
governments or German military occupational administration. Pursuant to
orders issued and executed by the defendants, these troops who continued
to resist were not recognized by Germany as belligerents, and when
captured were commonly denied the status of prisoners of war and were
shot or hanged. We will, subsequently, discuss the rules of war
pertaining to the qualifications of belligerent armed forces.
Count Three also charges other crimes against members of the armed
forces of various other allied nations, particularly in pursuance of the
notorious German order of October, 1942, under which numerous Allied
"commandos" were coldly murdered after their capture. It also charges
the murder of many officers and men of the Italian armed forces at the
time of and shortly after Italy's surrender to the Allies.
Count Four, finally, strikes a still more somber note. The crimes
charged therein were in now way related to military operations. We find
the defendants and their troops helping to "purge" south-eastern Europe
of the so-called "inferior peoples", such as Jews, and "politically
unreliable" individuals such as "democrats" and "nationalists". We find
them helping to enslave and deport the inhaibitants of these lands to
join the millions of other unfortunates from all over Europe who were
sucked into Germany to work for their conquerors in mines and
factories. We see the German army in a shameful role as the servant and
tool of Himmler, Sauckel, and other Nazi worthies.
Such in summary, are the chaeges[sic] in this indictment. The Tribunal
will observe, from the dates of the particular incidents set
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forth as illustations of the charges, that all four counts cover the
three and one half years from April 1941 to approximately October
1944. All four types of crime were committed throughout this period, and
often a single episode involved the commission of crimes under all four
counts. Consequently, in outlining the evidence today in presenting it
during the next few weeks, the prosecution[sic] proposes to proceed
chronologically, rather than count by count. We believe this will be
conducive to a more orderly and intelligible[sic] presentation. However,
in presenting particular documents or witnesses, we will of course,
specify which count or portion of a count the particular piece of
evidence supports.
Before taking up the evidence in more detail, it will be helpful to spend
a few moments in outlining the structure and organization of the German
military machine, and the way in which if functioned in occupied
countries, particularly in southeastern Europe. The prosecution has
already submitted to the Tribunal, and to defense counsel, a brief
memorandum on the organization of the German army, together with a series
of charts showing the chain of command of the more important military
units in southeastern Europe and northern Norway, with several maps of
Yugoslavia, Greece, and Norway, and other mechanical aids to the
understanding of this cause. One of these charts has been enlarged for
display on the wall of the courtroom.
A. The Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces.
Dr. LATERNSER (Counsel for the defendants List, and von Weichs): Mr.
President, I am sorry I have to interrupt at this moment. I am surprised
to hear right now the Tribunal has been presented by the prosecution with
an information referring to the defense. We are now in a criminal
procedure and as far as I know the person who makes a statement has to
prove that it is true. I don't know now how the prosecution[sic] wants
this information to be understood. If it
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should be regarded as evidence before this Tribunal in that case I must
object to the submitted information already to this Tribunal for a
summary of the prosecution is not a means of the evidence. We know the
criminal procedure and we know that it consists of evidence and
documentary evidence. I cannot see from the information that I have
received that a document is in question not been signed by
anybody. However, if it is merely information that is no evidence then
informing the Tribunal by this material, as far as I know foreign law,
can only then be right when the defense agrees with it.
For information of the Tribunal can merely be affected when everybody
agrees. In any case if this information is supposed evidence it has to
be rejected. We are merely dealing with statements of the prosecution
which have now to be proved, for which evidence has to be submitted. I
just want to put an example now and I shall soon finish. This
information also refers to this chart here, Chart D. It is supposed to
serve as information for the Tribunal, to brief the Tribunal. The moment
when I entered the court I saw two basic mistakes in this chart. The
mistakes are in the chart although in the first trial before the Military
Tribunal the position of the O.K.W. was discussed at large.
From this sketch we can see the O.K.W. and the O.K.M. and O.K.H. -- they
were supposed to be one group but that was never the case. The OKW was
merely a working staff of Hitlee's[sic] and if one regards the results of
the first trial, this staff cannot be put right or left in the chart
beside that little box, that means "Hitler", this is a basic mistake.
I shall soon finish. The next mistake results from the fact that, for
instance, army group F is connected with a line supposed to mean
technical subordinates. That also is not correct. I therefore ask the
Tribunal to ask the prosecution[sic] that the information which was
submitted by the prosecution may be withdrawn from the assumptions
contained in this information the prosecution will have to submit
evidence.
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GENERAL TAYLOR:
May it please Your Honors, the document in question
is, as I stated quite briefly, not evidentiary. It is in the nature of a
brief. Dr. Laternser, who has been before the IMT, is fully familiar
with the procedure. There has been such a brief submitted before every
trial that has taken -place in this courtroom. It is not
evidentiary. It is to enable the Tribunal and defense counsel to follow
the opening statements.
The matters contained therein will, to be sure, be supported by documents
which will be submitted during the prosecution's case in chief.
THE PRESIDENT:
The Tribunal, speaking through presiding judge, wishes
to state that this document which I now have before me was considered by
the Tribunal as merely informative. The members of this Tribunal are
members of courts in the States who have had many years of not only
trials but Appellate experience, and I am certain that I speak the
thoughts of my associates when I say to counsel that we shall only decide
this case upon the evidence as presented.
It should be kept in mind that the member of this Tribunal have been in
this city here, and its surrounding country, for only about one
month. Naturally we are desirous, and it is necessary, that we become
informed on the procedure that is to be followed in these cases. It is
necessary that we learn about the type of the case and the things that
will be presented, but I assure counsel for the defense, the defendants,
and all other parties concerned that the decision of this court will be
based solely upon the evidence as presented, and after counsel for the
defendants and the defendants themselves have had a full and fair
opportunity to present any matters in rebuttal which may have been
presented on behalf of the prosecution.
You may proceed, General Taylor.
GENERAL TAYLOR:
When Hitler came to power in 1933, the German armed
forces (which then consisted only of the Army and Navy, since the Air
Force did not yet officially exist) were controlled and administered by a
cabinet department called the Reich Defense Ministry. Under the
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Reich Defense Minister, at that time von Blomberg, the highest officers
of each branch of the service were called respectively the Chief of the
Army Staff, that being General von Fritsch, and the Chief of the Naval
Staff (Admiral Raeder).
In May 1935, when Germany started openly to overthrow the armament
restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, von Blomberg was given the title
of Reichsminister for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and
von Fritsch and Raeder were thereafter called the Commanders-in-Chief of
the Army and Navy respectively. However, the German Air Force, which was
officially born at about the same time, was not subordinated to von
Blomberg. It was established as an independent institution under
Goering, who took the title of Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the
Air Force.
In February 1938 there was a general reorganization of the German
military set-up. Von Blomberg and Fritsch were both retired, and Hitler
himself took the title of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
(Obersterbefehlshaber der Wehrmacht). At the same time Hitler created
the Armed Forces High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, usually
referred to as OKW), with authority over all three brances of the armed
forces. Wilhelm Keitel was installed as Chief of the OKW, and remained
in this capacity until the end of the war in 1945. The OKW was, in
effect, Hitler’s personal staff for all matters pertaining to the armed
forces, and Keitel’s function was that of Hitler’s executive officer for
the administration of the armed forces and the application of Hitler’s
policies.
As is shown by the chart on the wall (Chart "D" in the explanatory
pamphlet which the prosecution has submitted), the three components of
the armed forces were directly supordinated to Hitler and the
OKW. Admiral Raeder continued as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (OKM)
until 1943, when he was relieved by Admiral Doenitz. Goering continued
to head the Air Force (OKL) until the last month of the war. As Supreme
Commander of the Army to replace con Fritsch, Hitler selected General

Court 5 – Case 715 Jul 47-M-3-3-EHM-Stewart (Schaefer)(later Field
Marshal) Walter von Brauchitsch.
B. The German Army
The German army, needless to say, was by far the largest and most
important of the three branches of the Wehrmacht. Von Brauchitsch
continued as Commander-in-Chief only until December 1941, at which time
Hitler relieved him and himself took the title of Commander-in-Chief of
the Army in addition to that of Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces. This dual capacity led to a merging and overlapping of the
functions of OKW and OKH, and at times we may find it difficult to
differentiate between their respective responsibilities.
The field formations of the German army were normally subordinated
to OKH although, as we will see shortly, as the war progressed they were
on numerous occasions subordinated to OKW. The largest field formation
in the German army, as in most others, was known as an "Army Groups,"
which was, ordinarily, a headquarters controlling two or more
"armies". Army groups and armies were usually commanded by field
marshals and Generalobersts, ranks which are respectively the equivalent
of a five-star and four-star general in our own military hierarchy. A
German "army", however, was sometimes commanded by a mere "General",
which is the same as a lieutenant general (three stars) in the American
army.
Below the "army" were the lower formations, which followed the same
general pattern in the German army as in others – in order from top to
bottom, come the corps and the division, and then the smaller units such
as regiments, battalions, and companies. The most important types of
divisions were the infantry division, the armored or panzer division, and
the motorized or panzer-grenadier division, but the Germans used a number
of other special types. In southeastern Europe, where many miscellaneous
units were employed, we will frequently encounter the mountain division,
the security division (Sicherungsdivision, usually composed of older
soldiers), and the reserve division (usually composed of units still
undergoing training). There were also infantry divisions formed
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from the personnel of the German Air Force, and known as German air force
field divisions (Luftwaffenfelddivisionen).
Side by side with the corps and divisions of the regular German
army we find similarily [sic] designated formations of Heinrich Himmler’s
SS. Not content with his powerful position as head of the SS and of all
German police forces, Himmler inaugurated the recruitment and formation
into military units of hundreds of thousands of SS men trained and
equipped for front-line combat duty. This strictly military part of the
SS was known as the Waffen (armed) SS, and by the end of the war it
comprised no less than 30 divisions, as well as several corps
headquarters and an army headquarters. Himmler’s divisions were
consecutively numbered and carried special names. In southeastern
Europe, during the period covered by this case, the 7th SS Mountain
Division "Prinz Eugen", the 8th SS Cavalry Division "Florian Geyer", and
several others were very active. During the early part of the war, these
SS soldiers were almost all volunteers, frantically devoted to the
ideals, if such they may be called, of the SS. Later in the war a number
of SS divisions were formed by forcible conscription from the populations
of occupied countries. For some purposes, chiefly administrative in
nature, the Waffen-SS units remained under Himmler’s control, but for
operational purposes they were under the command of the German army, and
their employment differed little from that of the regular divisions of
the army.
As I stated earlier, the field forces of the German army were normally
under the OKH, but not infrequently, particularly during the latter part
of the war, they came to be subordinated directly to OKW. This was
particularly true in territories which the German army had overrun and
where military occupational authorities were established. In such
regions, the Germans often appointed a senior over-all commander, to whom
the heads of the Army, Navy, and Air Force units in that region were all
responsible. Such a commander, with local authority over all three
branches of the armed forces, was called an "Armed Forces Commander"
(Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber). In southeastern Europe, where the Army
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was the all-important branch of the service, the armed forces commander
was almost invariably an army general.
While the Armed Forces Commander had authority over all units of
the German armed forces in an occupied region, the administration of the
area, in conformity with German rules and policies, was commonly
entrusted to an army general designated as "Military Commander
(Militaerbefehlshaber). He had the primary mission of insuring security
and order, and for this purpose had at his disposal the German police
forces and, often, security divisions and regiments of the army. On
matters of military government policy, the Military Commander usually
took his orders direct from OKH, but as commander of the security and
police forces allotted to him, he was tactically subordinate to the Armed
Forces Commander in his territory.
Himmler’s police and intelligence empire also reached into the
occupied territories. Reflecting Himmler’s leadership of both the SS and
the German police, a Himmler emissary in the occupied territories was
called a "Higher SS and Police Leader" (Hoeherer SS und Polizei Fuehrer,
usually abbreviated HSSPF). His principal functions were to control the
local police authorities and carry out other special missions of a
security nature. The HSSPF’s remained personally responsible to Himmler,
but for tactical purposes were subordinated to the senior Military
Commander in their territory.
D. German Military Organization in Southeastern Europe and Northern
Norway.
The chain of command and order of battle of the German armed forces
in southeastern Europe was complicated and changed frequently. The
narrative is most logically broken into three principal periods of time.
From April 1941, when the invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia took
place, until August 1942 the focal point of German military authority in
southeastern Europe was the headquarters of the 12th Army. The defendant
List commanded the 12th Army until October 1941, at which time the
defendant Kuntze took charge as acting commander until August 1942.
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During this period the defendant Foertsch was Chief of Staff to both List
and Kuntze, the defendant Felmy commanded in southern Greece, and the
deceased Boehme in Serbia. The defendant Weichs was also active at the
beginning of this period. He commanded the Second Army, which invaded
Yugoslavia from the north, but he and his army were withdrawn from the
Balkans in May 1941 at the conclusion of large-scale operations.
The second period begins in August 1942 when Kuntze left the
Balkans and Generaloberst Alexander Loehr, now deceased, became
Commanding General of the 12th Army. At about the same time the
defendant Speidel followed Felmy as the commander in southern Greece, and
the defendant Geitner became Chief of Staff to the Military Commander in
Serbia, General Bader, who had replaced Boehme in December 1941. In
January 1943 the 12th Army was, as we say, "up-graded" and re-designated
as Army Group "E". General Loehr continued in command of Army Group "E"
with the defendant Foertsch as his Chief of Staff.
The third and final phase begins in August 1943, and thereafter the
organization remained substantially unchanged until the end of the
war. The new structure during this final period, shown in the chart on
the wall, was largely the result of the allied landing in Sicily; the
resultant threat to German dominion in the Balkans required a stiffening
of command and reinforcements. The defendant Weichs returned to the
Balkans in over-all command, with a headquarters designated Army Group
"F". Under him were General Loehr, with his jurisdiction now restricted
to Greece, the defendant Rendulic, as Commander-in-Chief of the Second
Panzer Army in Croatia, shown at the center of the chart, and General
Felber, of whom we will hear much in these proceedings, as Military
Commander for all of southeastern Europe, and with personal jurisdiction
in Serbia, shown in the center of chart.
Under Loehr were the defendants Felmy, who returned to Greece in
June 1943, and Lanz, both of whom commanded corps under Army Group
"E". The defendants von Leyser and Dehner were corps commanders under
Rendulic. Foertsch stayed on as Chief of Staff to Weichs and Geitner
remained as
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Chief of Staff to Felber. Spidel remained as Military Commander in
Greece, under the command of Felber as Military Commander for all of
southeastern Europe.
The situation in northern Norway is of importance in this case only
during the fall of 1944, when the German forces in northern Finland
retreated into Norway through the Norwegian province of Finnmark. These
forces, comprising the 20th Mountain Army, had been commanded by
Generaloberst Dietl, who was killed in an airplane crash during the
summer of 1944. The defendant Rendulic left his command of the Second
Panzer Army in Croatia and replaced Dietl in Finland. Te various units
subordinated to Rendulic’s 20th Mountain Army are shown in Chart "G" of
the prosecution’s pamphlet.
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GERMAN MILITARY POLICE WITH RESPECT TO "HOSTAGES"
Before turning to the particulars of the evidence, and to put this case
in its proper setting, we may remind ourselves that the war crimes of the
Germany army were not confined to southeastern Europe. In particular,
the practice of taking and executing so-called "hostages" from the
civilian population was instituted at the very outset of the war, and was
deliberately planned in advance.
In July, 1939, when plans for the invasion of Poland were being laid, the
OKH distributed to the army field commanders a series of directives for
the maintenance of security in Poland. This initial step was relatively
circumspect; the field commanders were told that "hostages" could be
taken, but that their execution would have to be approved in each
instance by OKH.
The subsequent history of this order might be styled "the rake’s
progress". About two months later, when Poland had been conquered, the
German Military Commander in the Polish city of Poznan ordered that:
.....hostages are to be taken from the Polish civilian population in
every village in which troops are billeted....In the event of attacks on
members of the Wehrmacht of persons who are German by race, hostages are
to be shot. Only senior officers holding the rank of a division
commander will issue orders to shoot hostages.
The "War Diary" of a German rear area commandant carries the
forward. Two weeks later, on October 15, 1939, two hostages
the village of Buk because a sentry had been shot at. Three
according to the diary, the following occurred in the Polish
Ottorowo and Samter:

story
were shot in
days later,
villages of

In Ottorowo: A carbine had been stolen, the room in which the burglary
was committed had been damaged, a swastika flag had been torn down and
the Polish Eagle put up. Sentence was passed by a court-martial of the
chief of civil administration and after a specified period of time had
expired, 5 hostages each were shot in Ottorowo and Samter. The execution
took place in the presence of the entire population. There were no
tears, and the fine of 10,000 zlotys imposed on the village of Ottorowo
was paid, probably with the help of the church
In Samter: Catholic services may be conducted only once a
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week..... The county governor intends to remove gradually from his county
the Polish intellectuals, the owners of large estates, and the clergy.
A Lieutenant, who is a district speaker for the Nazy [sic] Party in
civilian life, attends to the moral welfare of the troops.
Under this beneficient [sic] moral tutelage rapidly emerged, in fearful
shape, the German inferiority complex. The Poles were inferior peoples,
but the Germans could not be quite sure that this was really true until
all the educated Poles had been removed.
The following year the same pattern was repeated in France and the Low
Countries. It is June, 1940, and the defendant List, with his Twelfth
Army, is attacking across the Aisne River in France. The commander of
the rear area of his army gives the order that:
As soon as acts of sabotage – fires also belong in this category – are
found, hostages are to be taken. The arrest is to be announced
publicly. If the acts of sabotage are repeated, the hostages are to be
shot, according to the regulations previously issued, after sentence by a
Court – martial. Executions by shooting are to be reported to the Twelfth
Army and announced publicly.
Belgian citizens, however, may be shot only with the consent of OKH.
As the scourge of war spread from country to country, the ways of the
army grew even more savage. In 1941, as the Wehrmacht threw itself into
the Slavic countries of Eastern Europe, the Germans encountered people
whom they held in the contempt born of fear. In the Balkans and Russia,
they spread such death and terror that the conscience of the world was
made to reel and on October 25th, 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who is the
President of a country still at restless peace, declared prophetically:
The practice of executing scores of innocent hostages in reprisal for
isolated attacks on Germans in countries temporarily under the Nazi heel
revolts a world already inured to suffering and brutality. Civilized
people long ago adopted the basic principle that no man should be
punished for the deed of another. Unable to apprehend the persons
involved in these attacks, the Nazis characteristically slaughter fifty
or a hundred innocent persons. Those who would "collaborate" with Hitler
or try to appease him cannot ignore this ghastly warning.
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The Nazis might have learned from the last war the impossibility of
breaking men’s spirit by terrorism. Instead they develop their
"Lebensraum" and "new order" by depths of frightfulness which event they
have never approached before. These are the acts of desperate men who
know in their hearts that they cannot win. Frightfulness can never bring
peace to Europe. It only sows the seeds of hatred which will one day
bring fearful retribution.
GENERAL TAYLOR: Your Honor, this brings us to the point of the actual
invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia, and Mr. Clark Denny will continue with
the reading of the statement.
MR. DENNY: May it please Your Honor.
THE INVASION OF GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA
We may pass over very briefly the historical background of Germany’s
simultaneous and ruthless onslaughts against Greece and Yugoslavia in
April, 1941. The highlights are set forth in the judgment of the
International Military Tribunal,1 and a fuller account may be found in
the official transcript of the international trial.2
It appears from these accounts that, as early as August 1939, just
before the attack against Poland, Hitler had discussed with Ribbentrop
and Ciano how best the Axis partners could gobble up the neutral
countries of Europe. Hitler cynically suggested to Ciano:
Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the neutrals
to be liquidated one after the other. This process could be carried out
more easily if, on every occasion, one partner of the Axis covered the
other while it was dealing with the uncertain neutral. Italy might well
regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of this kind.
In making the suggestion, Hitler was no doubt catering to Mussolini’s
imperial ambitions in the Balkans, which had been reflected earlier that
year in the Italian occupation of Albania. For the next year, however,
Germany was sufficiently occupied with the

Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Vol. I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, pp.
210-213.
2 Vol.III, Trial of the Major War Criminals, pp. 307-324
1
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campaigns in Poland, Norway, the Low Countries and France, and the next
Axis moves in southeastern Europe did not occur until 28 October 1940,
when Italy launched its contemptible and ill-fated attack against
Greece. It was, furthermore, Mussolini’s inability to beat down the
heroic resistance of the Greeks that lead Hitler to march into the
Balkans the following year.
We may be sure that it was from no particular sympathy with Mussolini’s
plight in Albania and Greece that Hitler decided to come to his aid. On
the contrary, there is every indication that Hitler and the German
military leaders were pleased over the discomfiture of their Italian
allies, whom they held in such contempt throughout the war. But Hitler
was disturbed in Greece from which the valuable oil fields in Rumania
could be bombed. And furthermore, as Rommel’s campaign in North Africa
began to attract attention, Hitler’s thoughts turned increasingly towards
the eastern Mediterranean and the possibility of establishing German
superiority there. Accordingly, in November 1940, Hitler issued Top
Secret instructions to Brauchitsch, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army,
directing him to:
Make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland, north of the Aegean
Sea, in case of need, entering through Bulgaria and thus making possible
use of German Air Forces units against targets in the eastern
Mediterranean, in particular against those English air bases which are
threatening the Rumanian oil areas.
All this time, however, the German High Command was chiefly preoccupied
with preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union, which they had
planned for the following spring. This formidable military task required
all the forces the Germans could muster and accordingly Hitler and the
generals wished to carry out any enterprise which might have to be
undertaken in the Balkans with the utmost economy of means. Therefore,
there was at this time no intention whatsoever of invading Yugoslavia in
addition to
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Greece; on the contrary, Hitler began an intensive diplomatic campaign to
swing Ygoslavia [sic] to the side of the Axis and induce her to join the
so-called "Tri-partite Pact", to which the principal adherents were
Germany, Italy, and Japan.
A. The plan of Attack.
By December, the plans for the invasion of Greece, known under the code
name "Marita", had begun to take shape:
My plan therefore is (a) to form a slowly increasing task force in
southern Rumania within the next month, (b) after setting in of favorable
weather, probably in March, to send a task force for the occupation of
the Aegean north coast y way of Bulgaria and if necessary to occupy the
entire Greek Mainland.
To carry out the essential first step of persuading Bulgaria to permit
the passage of German troops from Rumania to Greece, the defendant List
was sent to Sofia, where he secured the necessary consent at a conference
early in February, 1941. At the same time, Bulgaria agreed to join the
tri-partite Pact, and a time schedule was established, pursuant to which
List, with his Twelfth Army, would commence the building of bridges
across the Danube from Rumania into Bulgaria on the 28th of February,
Bulgaria would adhere to the Pact on the first of March, and List’s
forces would move across the bridges into Bulgaria on the second of
March. All of this happened according to schedule, and List’s army
started acrpss [sic] Bulgaria toward the northern frontier of the Greek
mainland.
Simultaneously, diplomatic pressure on Yugoslavia was
increased, and on the 25th of March the Yugoslav Premier and the Foreign
Minister signed the Tri-partite Pact at Vienna. Had all gone as planned,
Yugoslavia’s adherence to the Axis would have enabled List to attack from
Bulgaria into Greece without fear that Yugoslavs might invade Bulgaria
and cut him off.
But for once, Hitler’s time table was upset.

The following day
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the Yugoslavs repudiated their government’s adherence to the pact and the
Premier was removed from office. Yugoslavia "emerged on the morning of
the 27th of March, ready to defend, if need be, her independence".1
The same day, Hitler and his generals met in council of war. It was
pointed out that the uncertain attitude of the new Yugoslav government
not only represented a threat to List’s rear in the attack against Greece
but would also constitute a potential menace behind the German forces
which were being assembled for the attack against the Soviet
Union. Hitler announced his determination "to make all preparations in
order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit." No
diplomatic inquiries were to be made, no assurances by the 1 Yugoslavian
government were to be regarded, and the attack was to start at the first
possible moment. Political considerations played a large part in the
plans. The old feuds between the Serbs and the Croates [sic] were to be
capitalized to the
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utmost. Turkey was to be frightened out of her wits by the ruthlessness
of the attack. The cooperation of the neighboring Balkan states was to
be secured by territorial promises. Hitler said:
Politically, it is especially important that the blow against Yugoslavia
is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the military
destruction is done in a lightening like undertaking. In this way, T
urkey [sic] would become sufficiently frightened and the campaign against
Greece later on would be influenced in a favorable way. It can be
assumed that the Croates [sic] will come to our side when we attack. A
corresponding political treatment (autonomy later on) will be assured to
them. The war against Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy,
Hungary, and Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised to
these states; the Adriatic coast for Italy, the Banat for Hungary, and
Macedonia for Bulgaria.
The military plans for a simultaneous attack against Yugoslavia and
Greece, to replace the plans for the Greek campaign alone, were drawn up
during the last few days of March, 1941. The plan for Yugoslavia was
called "Operation 25", and was dove-tailed neatly into "Marita". List’s
Twelfth Army, in addition to pushing across the south Bulgarian frontier
into Greece, was to send an armoured assault group across Bulgaria’s
western border into southern Yugoslavia with the objective of capturing
the key city of Skoplje, and then continuing across southern Yugoslavia
into Albania and joining forces there with the Italians. Another of
List’s armoured groups, under the well-known General (later Fieldmarshal)
von Kleist, would push from Bulgaria into Yugoslavia in a northwesterly
direction toward Belgrade. To complete the concentric operation, strong
German forces were to be assembled at the southern Austrian border, and
strike southward into Croatia, and a smaller force was to advance
southward from Rumania toward Belgrade. The German Air Force, in
addition to its normal support functions, was to destroy the city of
Belgrade by attacks in waves at the very outset of hostilities.
B. The Invasion.
The plans were well-laid, German strength was overwhelming, and
everything went like clock-work. At dawn on Sunday morning, April 6,
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Belgrade was mercilessly bombed, List attacked south into Greece and west
into Yugoslavia, and the next day Scoplje was taken and Kleist started
northwest toward Belgrade. Soloniki fell on the ninth. On the 10th, the
German Second Army, which had been assembled in southern Austria under
the command of the defendant von Weichs, started south through Croatia at
great speed and captured Zagreb. On the 11th, List effected a junction
with the Italians in Albania. On the 12th, Yugoslovia’s north front
against von Weichs collapsed; the Germans had played cleverly on the
ancient Serb-Croat enmity, and the Croates offered little resistance and
began to clamor for independence. By Easter Sunday the 13th, Kleist’s
forces held all of Belgrade, and the Germans began a complacent division
of the spoils between themselves and their satellite allies. The
Yugoslav government capitulated two days later, and by the 16th of April
large scale operations had come to an end. The campaign in Greece took
longer, but the Greek forces in the north were forced to surrender by the
22nd of April, and by the 28th Athens had fallen. In anticipation of the
campaign against Russia, now only a few weeks in the future, the Germans
began pulling out of Yugoslavia and Greece as many troops as could be
spared and transport could move, leaving behind only enough for security
purposes and for the invasion of Crete which, under the cover name
"Merkur", was to start out on the 20th day of May.
C. von Weichs and the 100:1 "Hostage" Ratio
As appears from the foregoing account, the three principal military
figures of the German campaign in southeastern Europe were Von Kleist and
the defendants List and von Weichs. After the capitulation of
Yugoslavia, Kleist departed almost immediately to head an armoured group
in the attack on Russia. List remained as Supreme Commander of the armed
forces in the southeast, and his actions in this capacity will shortly be
described.
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The defendant von Weichs and his Second Army were scheduled for ultimate
employment on the Russian front, but did not take part in the initial
attack. Von Weichs remained in Croatia until the latter part of May,
while List completed the conquest of Greece and Crete. In the meantime ,
the puppet government of Croatia, headed by Pavelic, was being
established, and von Weichs participated in the recruitment and
organization of Croatian militia units, known as "ustashi", who were
strongly anti-Serbian and whom the Germans were counting on to maintain
security in Croatia.
Thereafter, von Weichs and his Second Army headquarters departed, and von
Weichs did not return to the Balkans until August 1943. Short as was his
stay in the southeast in 1941, he left an indelible imprint as the result
of his methods of "pacification".
Just after the German attack on the Soviet Union, the Russian radio
broadcast a report that, as a result of the alleged murder of two German
Soldiers in Belgrade, 100 Serbs had been shot to death. The defendant
List, upon making inquiry, learned that no such episode had in facto
occurred in Belgrade at that time, but that the Russian report was
undoubtedly based on an episode which had occurred in April, 1941, in the
course of Von Weichs’ southward march. As a result of the incident, von
Weichs had issued on the 28th of April, 1941, the following order,
distributed throughout the Second Army down to battalion level:
The increase in malicious attacks on German Soldiers necessitates most
stringent counter-measures. Only immediate and ruthless measures
guarantee the maintenance of peace and order and prevent the forming
bands.
1) A Division sent out a detachment to carry out the disarmament of a
Serbian village. The leader rode on ahead with another officer and a
Wachtmeister, whereupon he was overtaken by a Komitadschi band (in
Serbian uniform) and was shot to death. His companions were seriously
wounded. This occurrence gives us cause to make the following
statements:
a) After conclusion of the Armistice there is no Serbian solder in the
whole area who is authorized to carry arms.

15 July-M-BK-5-4-Urmey (Int. Schaefer)
Court V, Case 7.
b) Whoever is found in Serbian uniform with weapon in hand transgresses
the bounds of International Law and is to be shot to death immediately.
c) If in any area an armed band appears, then even those men capable of
bearing arms who are seized because they were in proximity of the band
are to be shot to death, if it cannot immediately be ascertained with
certainty that they were not connected with the band.
d) The bodies of all persons shot to death are to be hanged and left
hanging.
e) Arresting hostages after a surprise attack is wrong and is by no means
to be taken into consideration. On the contrary, action is to be taken
only according to letters a) to d).
2) As preventative protection of the troop against such malicious
surprise attacks, I give the following orders:
These orders are given in part.
* * * * * * * * * * *
d) In the endangered villages, placards are to be posted wherein the
population is notified of the serious consequences to be expected from
surprise attacks (the posters will be sent separately).
e) In all localities of the endangered area which are occupied by troops,
hostages are to be taken immediately (from all classes of the population)
who are to be shot to death and hanged after a surprise attack. This
measure is to be made public in the villages immediately
3) In cases of surprise attacks on the troops, the Division Commanders
should examine in detail whether the troop leader in question is to be
blamed. IN the reports of the Division, regarding encountered surprise
attacks, there should always and immediately be a statement to the effect
that the attacks were atoned by ruthless measures and account be given as
to the manner employed.
The placards which were posted in Serbian villages as a result of this
order read as follows:
By a mean and malicious surprise attack, German soldiers have lost their
lives. German patience is at an end. As atonement, 100 Serbs of all
classes of the population have been shot to death. In the future,100
Serbs are to be shot without consideration for every German soldier who
comes to harm as a result of a surprise attack conducted by Serbs.
Irrelevant as any such circumstance might be, there is nothing to
indicate that von Weichs received any directive or suggestion from above
calling for the issuance of any such order. It
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appears that he conceived the order in his own mind and issued it on his
own initiative. It epitomizes the German terror which raged in the
alkans for the next three and one half years. It embodies the two
fundamental policies which List and his successors applied: That the
enemy should be denied even the bare right of continued resistance and
his troops no longer be recignozed [sic] as belligerents entitled to the
protection of the laws of war, and that attacks against German soldiers
should be suppressed by executing civilian "hostages" at the astonishing
ratio of 100:1. The only important respect in which subsequent practice
departed from von Weichs’ precedent was that his injuction that
"hostages" should not be arrested after an attack, but should always be
taken in advance and executed after the attack, was found to present
serious inconveniences. With a required ratio of 100:1, it was
impossible to keep enough hostages on hand to meet all contingencies, and
in subsequent months the Germans repeatedly transgressed this rather
formal and academic restriction which von Weichs had laid down.
THE OCCUPATION: LIST AND KUNTZE
(April 1941 – August 1942)
As von Weichs and Kleist withdrew from the Balkans and turned their
attention to Russia, the German High Command drew up blueprints of the
military occupational administration for southeastern Europe, which List
was to head. To understand the organization which was created, we must
first look at map "A" in the prosecution’s explanatory pamphlet, which
shows the partition of Yugoslavia effected by Germany and her satellites.
A. The Partition of Yugoslavia and Greece.
In northern Croatia, it will be observed medium-sized portions were
annexed by German, Italy, and Hungary. The remainder of
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Croatia, except for those parts of the Adriatic coast which Italy annexed
outright, was established as an "autonomous" state, headed by Dr. Anton
Pavelic, who called himself the Poglavnik" of Croatia. Most of the
eastern part of Croatia was occupied by Italian forces, and the Germans
were not particularly active there until the collapse of Italy in 1943.
In the southern part of Yugoslavia Italy also took Montenegro under her
control, and Italy absorbed still more by the device of "annexation" to
Albania. Serbian Macedonia was annexed to Bulgaria.
The truncated Serbia which remained was put under German military
occupational administration, although the southern part of this rump
remainder was occupied by Bulgarian troops. It is this portion of Serbia
which passed under German administration with which we will be chiefly
concerned during the period up to August 1942.
The occupational fate of Greece is shown on map "C". It will be observed
that the greater part of the Greek mainland and the Peloponnesus came
under the sway of the Italians. Bulgaria took the long arm of eastern
Greece along the northern shore of the Aegean Sea. The Germans Contented
themselves with small, strategically situated portions. On the
mainland,
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they occupied the area around Saloniki and a narrow strip along the
Turkish border. They maintained troops in Athens, although nominally
control of Athens was shared with the Italians. They also occupied Crete
and various smaller islands in the Aegean Sea.
B. Structure of the German Occupational Administration
Four of the defendants in the box, as well as the deceased Boehme,
occupied key positions in the German occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece
during this period. By far the most important, of course, was the
defendant List, who, on 9 June 1941, was appointed by Hitler as Armed
Forces Commander of all German forces in southeastern Europe, with the
title Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Suedost (Armed forces Commander
Southeast). In this capacity, List was directly responsible to Hitler
and the OKQ. List also retained the title of Commander-in-Chief of the
12th Army. The defendant Foertsch was his Chief of Staff. List
maintained his headquarters at Saloniki. In October 1941 List fell ill,
and thereafter, up to August 1942, the defendant Kuntze was the acting
Commander-in-Chief of the 12th Army.
Under List (and subsequently Kuntze) were three Military Commanders – one
in Serbia and two in Greece. The deceased Boehme, who commanded the 18th
Mountain Corps of the 12th Army, was Commanding General in Serbia from
September to December, 1941. He went to Finland at the end of the year
and was replaced by General Paul Bader, who is also believed to be now
dead.
In Greece a Military Commander for the Saloniki area and the northern
Aegean islands was appointed by OKH, and a Military Commander for
southern Greece, with authority at Athens and in Crete and the southern
Aegean islands, was appointed by the German Air Force. The defendant
Felmy was Goering’s selection for this position.
Accordingly, during the period up to August 1942 we will be primarily
concerned with the activities of the defendants List, Kuntze, and
Foertsch, as well as such acts of Boehme and Bader as are relevant to
this proceed-
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ing. We will not at this time discuss the acts of the defendant Felmy in
southern Greece, inasmuch as the bulk of the evidence pertaining to
Greece relates to the period after August 1943, when Italy capitulated
and the Germans took over the entire occupation of Greece. It will,
therefore, be more convenient to deal with all the evidence pertaining to
Greece at a later stage.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Denney, please. You are starting into a different
portion of your statement. This will be a convenient place to
interrupt. The tribunal will be in recess for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
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THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
MR. DENNEY: May it please Your Honors. We now take up the discussion of
the activities of the defendants List, Foertsch, and the deceased Boehme
during the period April to October 1941.
The defendant List was an able protagonist in fields ideological as well
as military. This is indicated in a letter of 23 April 1941 written by
Alfred Rosenberg, who was later appointed Reich Minister for Occupied
Eastern Territories, to Martin Bormann. Part of this letter stated:
Art objects generally do no come into the question as far as the Balkans
are concerned, only there are Free Masonry archives and Jewish libraries
and other relevant research bodies. In my opinion, only the same
attitude as that prevailing in occupied French territory can be taken and
what I requested was really only an expansion of an already existing
regulation. For with General Field Marshal List, and likewise with the
General Quartermaster of the Army, the work has already been begun and my
men are already at work with these circles in Belgrade. And on command
of General Field Marshal List, as well as of his Deputy General, these
men will also be employed in closest relationship with the Security
Service (SD) in Salonika. As you know, Salonika is one of the largest
Jewish centers.
The capitulation was barely finished; yet List, the soldier, was making
himself a party to the "cultural" work of the Third Reich.
Early in September 1941, List determined that matters in Serbia required
a more forceful executive authority in that territory. With this in
mind, List teletyped to OKQ and OKH requesting that Boehme, at that time
Commanding General of the 18th Mountain Corps, 12th Army, that he be
assigned with his staff as Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia
with supreme authority in that sector, directly responsible to
List. List regarded Boehme as being "especially suited" for the position
because he had "an excellent knowledge of conditions in the
Balkans." This request was answered by a Hitler order of 16 September
1941 in which List was charged with the task of suppressing the insurgent
movement in the southeast area, and Boehme was designated as
Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia with executive power,
directly subordinate to List. All military and civilian offices in
Serbia were instructed to comply with Boehme’s orders.
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Upon receipt of the Hitler order, List, on 19 September 1941, advised the
Military Commander in Serbia, the LXV Corps Command, and the German
General in Zagrab, who was the liaison between the Croatian government
and the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, that Boehme had received entire
executive power in Serbia and that "all command authorities and forces
of the Army existing there or to be transferred there are subordinated to
him." He stated further, "Instructions for the carrying out of operations
for the necessary protective measures will be given by me only to General
Boehme, who is responsible for their being carried out."
One of the first acts of Boehme in his new post, for which List had
stated he was "especially suited", was the publishing of an order, which
he directed that the recipients destroy after dissemination, and which
read as follows:
In March of this year Serbia shamefully broke her friendship treaty with
Germany, in order to strike the German units marching against Greece in
the back.
German revenge stormed across the country.
We must turn to new, greater goals with all our forces at hand. For
Serbia, this was the sign for a new uprising to which hundreds of German
soldiers have already fallen in sacrifice. If we do not proceed here with
all means and the greatest ruthlessness, our losses will climb to
immeasurable heights.
Your mission lies in carrying out reconnaissance of the country in which
German blood flowed in 1914 through the treachery of the Serbs, men and
women.
You are the avengers of these dead. An intimidating example must be
created for the whole of Serbia which must hit the whole population most
savagely.
Everyone who wishes to live charitably sins against the lives of his
comrades. He will be called to accounr [sic] without regard for his
person and placed before a court material.
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So it was the List’s Corps Commander, now Plenipotentiary Commanding
General in Serbia, set the same keynote as had von Weichs for the program
of subjugation through terror which was to pervade in the Balkans for the
ensuing years of the war.
Now that the chain of command has been clearly established, let us
return momentarily to List’s request of 14 September directed to OKW. His
communication starts with the words "Threatening development of the
overall situation in Serbia demands energetic measures." Later on, he
states "the present command regulations are based on peaceful conditions
and are unbearable under the present turbulent combat conditions". This
request having been received at OKW, another order was issued, in
addition to the Hitler order appointing Boehme mentioned above. After
reciting that it had been established that the opposition to the
occupying power was the result of a centrally directed mass movement and
that each incident of insurgence against the German Wehrmacht, regardless
of individual circumstances, must be assumed to be of communist origin,
the order directed:
In order to stop these intrigues at their inception, severest measures
are to be applied immediately at their first appearance, in order to
demonstrate the authority of the occupying power and in order to prevent
further progress. One must keep in mind that a human life practically
counts for naught in the affected countries and a deterring effect can
only be achieved by unusual severity. In such a case, the death penalty
for 50 to 100 communists must in general be deemed appropriate as
retaliation for the life of a German soldier. The manner of execution
must increase the deterrent effect. The
reverse procedure, to proceed
at first with relatively easy punishment and to be satisfied with the
threat of measures of increased severity as a deterrent, does not
correspond with these principles and is not to be applied.
This was the answer of the Army High Command to List’s plea for help in
"turbulent combat conditions". The order was passed on by list to his
subordinate units.
Not satisfied with the initial directive with reference to the
killing of innocent people in the Southeast, an additional OKW order,
signed by Keitel, came down on 28 September, 1941.
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In this order it was directed that Military Commanders have hostages
available at all times in order that they might be executed when German
soldiers were attacked. The complete ruthlessness of the second Keitel
order may be seen from the following provisions:
Because of attacks on members of the Wehrmacht which have taken place
lately in the occupied territories, it is pointed out that it is
opportune for the Military Commanders to have always at their disposal a
number of hostages of different political persuasions, i.e.,
1)

Nationalists,

2)

Democratic Middle Class,

3)

Communists

It is of importance that among these are leading personalities or members
of their families.
Their names are to be published. In case of an
attack, hostages of the group corresponding to that to which the culprit
belongs are to be shot.
Nowhere in this order did Keitel attempt to enlighten his commanders as
to the means to be employed in identifying the "culprit". It was a
matter of little concern to him, and the evidence will show that it
concerned his field commanders even less. The manner in which this order
was complied with will be detailed at greater length in the evidence
which is presented to the Tribunal.
The 100:1 ratio having been proclaimed, Boehme, on 4 October 1941,
ordered the execution of 2100 persons, to be taken from the concentration
camps at Sabac and Belgrade.
Those to be executed were primarily Jews
and communists. These killings were reprisals for the deaths of 21
German soldiers. On 9 October, 1941, the chief of the Security Police in
Belgrade reported that 2100 Jews and gypsies were being executed by the
Wehrmacht in reprisal for 21 German soldiers shot to death. The Security
Police in this operation were to make available to the Wehrmacht the
required number of victims. The report continues that 805 Jews and
gypsies were taken from the camp in Sabac and the balance, 1295, were
taken from the Jewish transit camp in Belgrade.
On 9 October 1941 , Boehme informed List of "an execution by
shooting of about 2000 communists and Jews in reprisal for 22 murdered
men of the 8th Battalion of the 51st Army Signal Communication Regiment".
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A partial report of this action was made to List and Boehme by a Major
who commanded the 2nd Battalion of the 51st Army Signal Regiment. The
Major’s report enclosed a report of the Lieutenant who commanded the
company which carried out a portion of this action.
The Lieutenant’s
report is dated 13 October, 1941. The report is sordid in its detail;
the shooting of 2200 Jews in the camp at Belgrade had been ordered on 8
October, 1941. The action took place on 9 October in a forest [sic]
seven miles from Kobin, and on 11 October near the Belgrade shooting
range on the road to Nisch. No detail was overlooked, films and pictures
were to be taken by an Army Propaganda Company. By issuing spades and
other tools to the inmates who were to be executed, the atmosphere of a
working party was simulated. Only three guards were placed on each truck
to further allay the suspicions of the wretched victims. The prisoners
were happy to be leaving the camp, if only for a day of work in the
fields. The solders were able to execute only 180 on 9 October, and 269
on 11 October. The executions were accomplished by rifle fire at a
distance of 12 meters. Five shots were ordered for the shooting of each
prisoner. Articles of value were removed under supervision. They were
later sent to the Nazi People’s Welfare or the Security Police in
Belgrade. The Lieutenant reported that the attitude of the prisoners at
the shooting was calm and that following the killings the troops
"returned to their quarters satisfied."
It was while List was Armed Forces Commander Southeast that
concentration camps were introduced in that area. The Military Commander
in Serbia, in a letter of 22 June, 1941, spoke of a "concentration camp
which I had been ordered to erect." He spoke of the future inmates
as "communists and other criminal types".
List himself recommended concentration camps in an order of 5
September, 1941.
He stated that the relatives of those people resisting
the Army should be transported to concentration camps.
Often has it been urged that the German Army had no knowledge of
concentration camps, or at best that they had nothing to do with them.
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It has been the repeated refrain of the German military men that such
matters were beyond the scope and beneath the concern of a soldier, and
that such affairs handled by Himmler and his subordinates. In the
Southeast, the Army not only had knowledge of the camps; they were in
charge of some of them.
An order of 11 September, 1941 will
show that
the Concentration Camp Serbia, in Belgrade, was made subordinate to the
Military Commander of Serbia on that date.
Again, in an order of 18 September, 1941, issued by Bader of the
LXV Corps, it was stated, in connection with mopping-up operations, that
"the entire male population above 14 years of age is to be arrested, to
be sent to a concentration camp which the Division will install, and to
be detained there."
Boehme in an order of 23 September, 1941, to the 342nd Division,
directed that unit to "…evacuate Sabac by surprise attack of the entire
male population, ages 14-70, and take it to a concentration camp..."
Boehme further concerned himself with the transfer of the Jarak
concentration camp from the 342nd Division to the 64th Police Reserve
Battalion in an order of 27 September, 1941, which specified in addition
that inmates would receive half rations — only 200 grams of bread daily
and 200 grams of meat weekly.
Early in October, Boehme ordered that a concentration camp be
located in the Zasaviza area, capable of holding 30,000 inmates This
camp was to be [smudge] "guarded by restricted forces and closed from the
outer world". In the same order, he directed that inmates from another
concentration camp be brought to work on this new construction project.
The evidence will show how the Army used the concentration camps as
collection points for innocent people who were to be channeled into
German industry or to be used for such other purposes as might be
directed.
Two final references to List concern his later acts prior to his
post being handed over to the defendant Kuntze. On 4 October, 1941, he
issued an order in which it was directed that men in insurgent territory
who were not encountered in battle were to be examined and "if they are
only
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suspected of having taken part in combat, of having offered bandits
support of any sort, or of having acted against the Wehrmacht in any way,
to be held in s [sic] special collecting camp.
They are to serve as
hostages in the event that bandits appear, or anything against the
Wehrmacht is undertaken in the territory mopped up, or in their home
localities and in such cases they are to be shot." This was in keeping
with the spirit of an earlier order which he had issued on 5 September,
1941, which provided in part for:
Immediate ruthless measures against the insurgents, their assistants, and
their relatives (hangings, burning down of localities participating,
increased arresting of hostages, deportation of family members into
concentration camps) .
We are now turning to the period from October 1941 until August 1942
where we areprimarily [sic] concerned with the defendants Kuntze,
Foertsch, the deceased Boehme and the believed to be deceased Bader.
The defendant Kuntze succeeded to the command of the 12th Army late
in October, 1941. The measures which had been started under his
predesessor, [sic] List, were continued with increased severity. Kuntze
received periodic reports of the activities of the troops under his
command. These reports recited the seizing and killing of "hostages" and
the wanton destruction of villages.
On 2 November, 1941, a situation report was signed, on behalf of
Kuntze, by the defendant Foertsch. This report gives as one of the
reasons for the unrest in the southeast, refers to:
The fact that refugees expelled from the seperated territories (from
Croatia – 110,000; from Hungary – 37,000; from Bulgaria – 20,000) who
were transported across the frontier without means and without sufficient
care.
The report then set forth the methods to be followed by Kuntze’s
subordinates in combating opposition.
It was stated that he had charged
Boehme with the suppression of Serbia and Croatia.
He ordered that "all
prisoners taken during combat or mopping-up operations will be hanged or
shot to death" and that "for the time being, arrests are being made only
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for purposes of interrogation or to supplement reconnaissance." In
addition, he directed that all male civilians be temporarily collected in
camps.
Late in November, or early in December, 1941, Kuntze went to
Belgrade. Some notes were made on this trip. One of the items which
concerned Kuntze was the question of resettlement. This memorandum
provided:
The question of the resettlement of women and children of the insurgents,
as well as other unreliable elements, is still being examined. The
retention of these people in Serbia, south of the Danube, does not appear
to be practical. There are still difficulties with respect to shelter,
rations, and guard which oppose the transfer into the Banta.
All Jews and gypsies are to be transferred into a concentration camp at
Semlin (at present there are about 16,000 people there). They were proven
to be the bearers of the communication service of the insurgents.
On 20 December,
Commanding General in
earlier in the month,
there had been proper
reprisals, he stated:

1941, Kuntze’s subordinate, the Plenipotentiary
Serbia, Bader, who had succeded [sic] Boehme
issued an order to his troops. After reciting that
compliance with the prior orders concerning

The reprisal measures will be continued further. In order to exclude any
existing doubts concerning them, I am referring to the fact that these
groups of prisoners are to be differentiated: Reprisal prisoners are
persons who, for reason of their attitude, are destined for reprisals for
German human lives, for example, communists not encountered with weapons,
gypsies, Jews, criminals, and the like.
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Hostages are persons who play a role in public life and on the basis of
their personalities exercise a certain influence on the population in
their realm of activity. They comprise the most varied strata of the
population. They guarantee with their lives the public peace, order and
security in their part of the country.
Prisoners of the unit are persons who are taken in the course of an
operation, as suspicious. They require a further examination by the
administrative sub-area headquarters authorities. They will either be
released or transferred to the reprisal prisons.
It is clear that there was to be no change, save for the worse,
under Kuntze as Armed Forces Commander Southeast, in the matter of
"hostage" takings and retaliatory killings.
The policy as set forth was implemented by further orders of the
German division commanders. Hoffman, the Commanding General of the 342nd
Division, on 6 January, 1942, issued an order to his troops which
provided "Communists, in any event, will be shot immediately after a
short interrogation; only in special cases will they be brought back to
the Division."
A particularly harsh policy was established by Kuntze made
effective on 6 February, 1942. He called for detailed reports on counter
measures taken by subordinate units. He further directed that persons who
loitered around the battle field should be considered as having taken
part in the battle and therefore should be shot.
With the advent of spring, Kuntze anticipated increased activity
from the people of the occupied area. With this in mind, he issued an
order on 19 March 1942. He emphasized the degree of importance which he
attached to the regimental commanders and stated that Himmler’s secu-
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rity units and the Serbian police should cooperate closely with the
German troops.
He directed that "captured insurgents are to be hanged or shot as a
matter of principle. If they are used for information purposes, this only
postpones their execution. In an appendix to the same order, he advised
"It is better to liquidate 50 suspects than lose one German soldier." He
dictated that in areas which had been mined, the Serbian population,
among others, should be used to clear the terrain. And appeared there
again the 100:1 ratio in the event death came to any German.
Later in March, on the 23rd, Kuntze sent a teletype to Bader, in
which he agreed that inserrectionists not captured in battle should be
deported for work in Norway. He failed to explain how the identity of
those to be deported could be established.
Kuntze had more to say about forced labor on another occasion.
Bader, in an order of 25 March, 1942, mentioned an earlier order of
Kuntze, dated 18 March, which directed:
Persons who are arrested because of being suspected of supporting or
collaborating with the insurgents are to be handed over to concentration
camps; where they are to be interrogated (by the SS) who will make
further disposition, for example, handing over as forced laborers in the
German interest sphere.
From this same order, it is evident that three concentration camps
were presently available in this area at Sabac, Belgrade-Delinjo, and
Nisch, with a fourth to be opened shortly at Semlin.
Kuntze advised OKW from time to time of the success of the measures
he was directing in the Southeast. On 7 April 1942 he informed hthem
[sic] that since 1 September 1941, 11,522 of the enemy had been shot in
battle and 21,809 persons had been killed in relaliation [sic] measures.
On 23 June 1942 Kuntze advised OKW that a total of 37,477 had been shot
in battle or in a way of reprisals, as of that date, in Serbia and
Croatia.
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He mentioned that the mayor of Crete had been slain and, in retaliation
persons sharing in the guilt and a number of hostages were shot.
Kuntze left his post as Armed Forces Commander Southeast on 8
August 1942, but before leaving he knew that there had been more than
45,000 people killed by the Germans in Serbia and Croatia during the
period September, 1941, through July, 1942. He knew that people were
being deported to labor in the German war economy, both in the Reich and
in Norway. He knew that he had done his work well and faithfully in the
service of Hitler.
Mr. Fenstermacher will take up the opening statement at this time,
Your Honors.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: May it please the Tribunal, we take up now the
occupational period, August 1942 until August 1943.
By the 8th of August, 1942, when Generaloberst Alexander Loehr
replaced Kuntze as Commander-in-Chief of the 12th Army and Armed Forces
Commander Southeast, the German reprisal machinery was completely set up
and functioning. It remained only to keep the existing machinery running
and, if possible, to increase the efficiency with which the retaliation
measures were carried out.
The defendant Foertsch, who had served as Chief of Staff under both
List and Kuntze, remained in the same capacity throughout the twelve
months period of Loehr’s supreme command in the southeast. General Bader,
the Commanding General in Serbia under Kuntze, also stayed on. A few
weeks before Loehr arrived in the southeast, the defendant Geitner
arrived in Serbia as Chief of Staff to Bader.
To pacify the civilian inhabitants, Bader and Geitner divided
Serbia into various field headquarters areas which corresponded in the
main to the larger cities and important strategical points throughout the
country. The field headquarters areas were in turn sub-divided into
smaller territorial units known as district commands. This was the
organizational machinery which General Bader utilized for the security of
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Serbia.
When a telephone line was cut or railroad tracks torn up or a mine
blown shut or shipping on the Danube mined—whether by partisan units in
the course of legitimately planned actions, or by unknown persons—the
reprisal machinery swung into action. The discrit [sic] command notified
field headquarters of the incident and field headquarters in turn
notified Geitner, Bader’s Chief of Staff in Belgrade, suggesting that
certain stated reprisal measures be taken in retaliation. Geitner and
Bader would either approve the proposals of field headquarters or issue
new orders to cover the case. In either event, the district command was
notified, orders were issued and carried out, and reports were sent back
up through the established channels. The reprisal orders were almost
invariably the same. To insure the consistent execution of the German
program and to prevent delay, as well as to avoid the confusion that
might ensue from exercise of individual decision by the Ger,-man [sic]
mind, a retaliation code was established for the guidance of all
concerned. An arithmetical table was so easy to follow—even t he [sic]
slowest and dullest Battalion or Company Commander could comprehend its
ready meaning. What did it matter that the ratio of Serbs to Germans
seemed high or that innocent people would necessarily suffer for the
deeds of persons whom the Germans were unable, or did not even try, to
apprehend? Weren’t the Germans a superior race; and wasn’t it better that
99 innocent men—either hostages or son called reprisal prisoners—should
die than that one guilty person go free?
With the precedents that Weichs, List, Boehme, Kuntze and Foertsch
had established before them, Bader and Geitner on 28 February, 1943,
devised a more detailed table of retaliation quotas to take care of an
increased number of factual possibilities which new conditions had
brought to the fore:
For one German, or one Bulgarian Occupational Corps member, killed—50
hostages are to be executed.
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For one German, or one Bulgarian Occupational Corps member, wounded—25
hostages are to be executed.
For the killing of a person in the service of
regardless of his nationality, or a member of
High Serbian Official (district supervisor or
Serbian State Guard, or member of the Serbian
are to be executed.

the occupying power,
the Serbian Government,
mayor), official of the
Volunteer Corps—10 hostages

For the wounding of any person in the previous categories—5 hostages are
to be executed.
For an attack against important war installations, up to 100 hostages are
to be shot to death, according to the seriousness of the case.
That these retaliation quotas were no idle German boast or mere
paper threat is made quite clear by the literally dozens and dozens of
both orders and reports that poured in to, and went out from, Geitner’s
own hands:
15 December 1942— "5 D.M. followers shot in retaliation for the German
sergeant shot to death near Zlotovo."
25 January 1943— "Since the Organization Todt drive Braun had not
returned as of 1 January 1943, a total of 50 followers of Draja
Mihailovic and communists were shot to death,"
10 February 1943, near Gr. Milanovac— "25 Communists arrested, 10
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shot to death in reprisal for murder of mayor."
On 14 May 1943 the War Diary of the 104th Jaeger Division contained
this entry:
"The Division applies to the Commanding General and Commander in
Serbia for the shooting to death of 125 communist hostages and the
evacuation of the villages of Kamendo and Dubona in reprisal for the
attack on the railroad patrol Drazanj."
7 August 1943— "As retaliation for the surprise attacks in the RunjkovaoLeskovac District, on 16 and 28 July 1943, in which two members of the
German customs border guard were killed and two were wounded, 150
communist reprisal prisoners were shot."
15 August 1943— "15 Communist reprisal prisoners shot in retaliation for
murder of a mayor and the burning of threshing machines."
16 August 1943— "In retaliation for the killing of the leader of a mixed
harvesting crew on 7 August 1943, 50 communist reprisal prisoners were
shot".
On occasion they even returned to the earlier and higher quota of
100:1 for each German soldier killed. A proclamation by Bader of 19
February 1943 stated:
In the forenoon o f 15 February 1943 a passenger car of the German
Wehrmacht was attacked by partisans on the road Petrovan-Pozarevac near
Topanica. The four passengers, two officers, one non-commissioned officer
and one enlisted man were murdered and robbed. The vehicle was set on
fire.
As a reprisal measure 400 communists have been shot to death today in
Belgrade.h The village of Toponica was partly burned down. Several
hundred persons arrested, who were seized in the district area Pozarevac
will not return to their villages but will be given worthwhile employment
elsewhere.
The perpetrators of the attacks for which reprisal measures were
instituted were frequently unknown to the Germans. Sometimes, however,
the attacker was caught in the act or his identity became known. But
even knowledge or apprehension of the guilty offender did not rule out or
prevent the application of the retaliation table—the hostages had to be
shot anyway in order to set an example. The following entry for 24
December, 1942, in the War Diary of the 704th Infantry Division , a unit
subordinate to Bader, makes this last fact very clear:
Lieutenant Koenig, Executive Officer, II Battalion, 724th
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Grenadier Regiment and 2nd Lieutenant, Dr. Engelhardt, Battalion
physician of the II Battalion, 724th Grenadier Regiment, were fired on in
Mladenovac at 1413 hours by a 20 year old woman who was assumed to be a
communist. They were severely wounded (shot through lung and stomach) and
immediately transferred to the military hospital in Belgrade. A former
Chetnik leader was also shot to death by the women while trying to arrest
her. Later she shot herself. The 724th Grenadier Regiment ordered the
encirclement and search of Mladenovac. 72 men and 52 women were
arrested.
A part of the population fled immediately after the attack on
the officers. Local police and Serbian State guards participated in the
military measures without causing trouble. 3 pistols were found.
The Division applies for authorization to shoot in reprisal 50 hostages
and/or all people detained as retaliation prisoners.
The reply of Bader and Geitner to the division’s incredible application
is apparent from the entry in the division’s War Diary on the following
day:
49 men and one woman shot to death in Mladenovac for the attack on two
officers of the II Battalion, 724th Grenadier Regiment. 2nd Lieutenant
Dr. Engelhardt died in the military hospital in Belgrade. The Division
applies for authorization to shoot an additional 25 hostages and/or all
people detained as retaliation prisoners from the district of
Mladenovac. The execution will be carried out by the SD in Belgrade.
At least 75 innocent persons, perhaps more if the division’s
request to shoot all retaliation prisoners held in the Mladenovac
district was honored, were killed in spite of the fact that the guilty
party was known. This was German justice in Serbia on Christmas Day,
1942. Can any doubt remain that German policy in the Southeast, as in
Poland and the East, was designed and calculated to decimate the native
populations for generations and generations?
But if the saboteur or attacker was really unknown—that is, if even
the easily convinced Germans were too baffled to hazard a guess as to the
"culprit’s" political affiliation--then an equal number of both Draja
Mihailevic followers (D.M.’s as they were called) and Partisans would be
shot. The German reports are full of examples of such arbitrary and
indiscriminate executions. On 27 June 1943, Bader ordered:
15 communist and 15 D.M. hostages are to be shot to death in reprisal for
the attack and destruction of mines near Aleksinac on 8 June 1943.
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Another order of the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia,
this time of 13 August 1943, stated:
In retaliation for the murder of two and the wounding of two German
soldiers by insurgents on the highway at Pozarevac, 9 August 1943, 150
reprisal prisoners are to be shot.
Since the political origin of the perpetrators cannot be definitely
established, 75 D.M. and 75 communist reprisal prisoners are to be
executed.
To cope with the gigantic problem of hostage supply posed by this
wholesale reprisal program, the district commands turned for assistance
to their well-trained and widely experienced co-workers in mass crime,
the SD. With the help of native collaborators the SD had prepared lists
of "suspects" —relatives of men who were absent from a village or
immigrants without valid reason from another village, "persons of a
hostile attitude", and the like—the definition was uncertain and
ambiguous and no one quite knew how his name got on or remained off the
lists. One thing, however, was sure—there was no investigation and no
trial and no appeal from the German judgment of inclusion. From time to
time, as the available supply of hostages dwindled in the face of an
astounding number of mass executions, troops of the districts commands
and SD detachments would stage "special actions" to round up additional
victims., Large hostage camps were constructed at various strategic
places—their location were changed from time to time to make for more
efficient administration and quicker executions—and when the orders came,
the hostages would be shot, o [sic] either at the hostage camp itself or
on the site of the attack. In general, retaliation victims were supposed
to be residents of the village in or near which the attack allegedly
occurred. But if a sufficient supply of hostages or retaliation prisoners
was not on hand in a particular district camp, then the balance of
persons necessary to satisfy the hostage quotas would be shot from the
central camp in Belgrade. With a macabre fascination for mathematics and
a consuming passion for everything smacking of rote,
the Germans
enforced the code firmly, precisely, exactly— no matter where the
hostages were from.
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Two examples will suffice. On 28 May 1943, Bader issued the following
order to Field Area Headquarters 610:
A total of 100 D.M. hostages is to be shot to death in retaliation for
the murder of three members of the Russian Protective Corps near
Konarevo, wounding a member of the Russian Protective Corps near Ivanjica
on 11 May and for the murder of two members of the Serbian Volunteer
Coprs near Vezania.
Since D.M. Hostages are not available at the present time in the camp of
Field Area Headquarters 610, they are to be made available from other
camps by the Commander of the Security Police.
On the same day, 28 May 1943, Bador signed and Geitner distributed
a similar order to Field Area Headquarters 809:
150 communist hostages are to be shot to death in retaliation for the
murder of three members of the German customs border guard near Vucje on
15 May 1943.
Since there are no communist hostages available at present in the camp of
Field Area Headquarters Nisch, they are to be made available from other
camps by the Commander of the Security Police.
Nor was there ever any jurisdictional conflict between the district
commands and the SD over the sheer physical task of executing these
thousands of retaliation victims.
Generally losses of the military were
avenged by the military themselves.
Police units usually furnished the
execution squads in reprisal actions for their own losses, as well as for
attacks on other soldiers and installations under German
protection. Both groups were ready and willing to participate in the
mass massacres. If a particular hostage camp was administered by the SD
rather than by a temporarily under-manned district command, then its
personnel would supply the trigger men. There was no set rule; both
organizations cooperated to do the job at hand. The orders for the
actual executions, however, invariably came down through the military
Bader-Geitner chain of command.
The SD did not exercise a concurrent
jurisdiction. In those matters it was subordinate to, and took orders,
from the Wehrmacht commander in whose fiels [sic] area headquarters or
district area it was stationed and operating.
An entry in the War Diary
of the 104th Jaeger Division for 4 April 1943 states;
By order of the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia, in
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reprisal for the murder of the Organization Todt man shot to death by
communists 8 km. south of Pozarevac, 78 hostages were shot to death in
Pozarevac by the SD.
While Geitner was having conferences with SD leaders and the
subordinate troop commanders on such diverse subjects as conditions at
the Semlin concentration camp where "up to 100 persons were dying daily",
on "the execution of invalids, sick or pregnant women, or people over 60,
male or female", if they took part in combat, "with or without weapons",
against the Germans, on the deportation of the male population of whole
areas for labor in Germany, and kindred subjects, Foertsch at Supreme
Headquarters also kept occupied with current business.
To him and to
Loehr came the daily, weekly and reports from their vast Southeastern
empire—from Bader and Geitner in Serbia, from General Lueters, the German
Commander in Croatia, from General Brauer on the island of Crete, and
from various other commanders on the Peloponnese peninsula.
Croatia by this time was in an uprear. [sic] Tito’s Partisans were
growing stronger by the minute. By the end of 1942 they could boast of
having called a Congress, of a government of their own which exercised
control in an area 250 km by 100 km., of a regular civil and military
administration within that area, and of an armed force numbering almost
100,000 men skillfully organized into brigades, battalions and companies.
Lueters was completely unable to cope with the problem. He gave the
usual orders for the execution of hostages, the burning of villages, and
the arrest of "suspects" and relatives of "bandits", but to no
avail.
As the practical-minded Lueters himself pointed out, the
existing techniques and methods were wrong since "in any case, cleaningup or retaliatory action against the civilian population the innocent are
seized, the guilty having earlier taken to the woods". Nor should
captured partisans be shot as a matter of course, pleaded
Lueters. Perhaps if they were given fair treatment many of them would
desert—at least that new approach ought to be tried."
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But Lueters’ complaints fell on deaf ears at headquarters. Orders
continued to come through Foertsch from Loehr that they would assume
responsibility for what their subordinate commanders did, that no one
would be held responsible for having employed harsh methods, that
"individual soldiers should not be prosecuted for being too severe with
the native inhabitants", and that commanders who failed to take
retaliatory measures for reasons of negligence or softness would be held
responsible. In spite of the fact that the German intelligence service
reported the presence of partisan troop units, with the names of their
leaders, the various insignia of rank worn, the size of their battalions
and companies, their weapons, and other details, captured partisans
continued to be executed after a brief interrogation. The reports are
full of references to "temporary prisoners", as partisans captured-butnot-yet-executed were called:
3 August 1942— "In mopping-up, 39 temporarily arrested persons shot."
5 August 1942— "In west Bosnia another temporarily arrested 8 persons
shot."
17 August 1942— "In Syrmia, 90 persons shot in reprisal, 65 temporarily
arrested."
29 August 1942— "In Samarica 262 persons temporarily arrested, of this
number 20 shot immediately.
There was no trial, hearing or court martial for these men who
fought as honorable and patriotic soldiers for their nation. The orders
distributed to the lowest of units were unmistakably clear Lueter’s
directive to his troops of 7 January 1943 is representative:
"Execute
and hang partisans, suspects and civilians found with weapons. No formal
proceedings are necessary". No wonder that Foertsch could report to OKH
in Berlin that up to 24 August 1942, 49,724 and up to 8 September 52,362
"insurrectionists" had been shot in battle or by way of reprisals.
Just as it was in Serbia, the German directives in Croatia were by
now the old familiar ones—comb whole areas, seize the entire male
population capable of bearing arms for deportation to Germany for la-
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bor, choose "unreliables" as hostages to be executed in case of attacks
on convoys or communication lines, enter into negotiations with the enemy
for the exchange of wounded, the better treatment of prisoners, or
recognition of their belligerent status. Instead treat captured
partisans as criminals to be hanged after all possible information had
been drained from them, with or without torture. In Croatia, just as in
Serbia, the revolt continued to gain momentum.
By the middle of 1943,
with the Allies advancing in the Mediterraen [sic] Theater, the German
Commanders realized that what was going on in the Balkans was really a
war.
During the period of General Loehr’s supreme command, on 1 January 1943,
the 12th Army went out of existence, or more accurately from a practical
standpoint, it changed its name. Loehr’s headquarters was redesignated
Army Group "E", and until August, 1943, it remained the supreme
headquarters for the southeast theater.
The change, however, was of
little practical significance; Loehr continued to command and Foertsch
continued as his Chief of Staff. In Serbia, Bader and Geitner were still
subordinated to Loehr.
The structure of Army Group "E" is shown on Chart "C" of the
prosecution’s pamphlet.
To almost every rule there is an exception, and
the Court will note that here we have an army group to which no army was
subordinated;
instead, this army group commanded
a heterogeneous
col-
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lection of corps, Military Commanders, "fortress" commanders, and
others.
The tide of war was soon to bring about still another departure
from orthodox German military structure.
The German terror had not
brought peace and order in southeastern Europe; Serbia was as restless as
ever, and the partisan forces of Croatia and Greec e [sic] were growing
stronger all the time.
On the 10th of July, 1943, the Allies landed in
Sicily, and it became apparent that soon they would be on the Italian
mainland, and in a much better position to bring material assistance to
the national armies of liberation in Greece and Yugoslavia.
Faced with
these new and unfavorable developments, in August 1943 the Germans
reorganized the entire command structure in southeastern Europe. New
faces appeared and a familiar face reappeared. We will now turn to the
story of this last and most important occupational period.
tTHE [sic] OCCUPATION:

VON WEICHS AND RENDULIC

(After AAugust [sic], 1943)
The year 1943 was known to the American public as the "end of the
beginning". To the German Army, reeling under the heavy blows of Allied
military might, it was indeed the " beginning of the end". The invasion
of North Africa and Montgomery’s advance from Egypt in November, 1942
were followed by the crushing surrender of von Paulus’ crack Sixth Army
before Stalingrad.
Rommel’s retreat and defeat in Libya and Tunisia was
followed by the invasion and rapid conquest of Sicily. Finally it was
Italy’s turn.
With the invasion of the Italian mainland, the longdespised and very tired Italian accomplice collapsed in thankful relief.
A.

Reorganization of the Southeast Command.

Reorganization of the command structure was the first step taken towards
meeting the new challenge in southeastern Europe. From the Russian front
where, as commander of an army group he had won promotion to the rank of
Fieldmarshal, Hitler called Maximilian
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von Weichs.
A new army group headquarters – Army Group "F" – was
established in Belgrade, as the vehicle for von Weichs’ supreme command
over sou theastern [sic] Europe.
The defendant Foertsch, the veteran
of service as Chief of Staff under List, Kuntze and Loehr, now came to
Serbia as Chief of Staff to von Weichs.
The new command structure which von Weichs headed is shown in the
chart on the wall.
Loehr remained in Greece, and his headquarters
continued to be called Army Group "E", thus creating the double anomaly
of an army group with no "army" beneath it, and which was itself
subordinated to another army group. From this time on,
Loehr’s
headquarters concerned itself exclusively with Greece and the AAegean
[sic] Islands, and Loehr reported to von Weichs. The two corps
commanders under Loehr were the defendant Felmy, who had returned to
Greece in July, and the defendant Lanzz, [sic] who had been a divisional
commander during the original invasion of southern Yugoslavia, and who
arrived in Greece in August.
Althougth von Weichs maintained his headquarters in Belgrade, so
far as military operations against the partisans were concerned, the
center of gravity was shifting toward Croatia. To cope with Tito’s
partisans and to protect the long Dalmation coastline, exposed as it was
to an Allied invasion or raids from nearby Italy, the headquarters of the
Second Panzer Army, which had been engaged on the Russian front, was
moved to Croatia. To command this army, and to carry out the difficult
mission of re-establishing order in Croatia and safeguarding it against
enemy attacks, the German High Command selected the defendant Lothar
Rendulic. An Austrian, whose mother was Croatian, Rendulic had learned
much about the Balkans by the sheer process of growing up under the
Hapsburgs and living in the center of their sprawling empire. He had
joined the AAustrian [sic] Nazi Party in the early thirties at a time
when it
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had been declared illegal, and was regarded on all sides as a "Nazi
General." In 1938, he was the Austrian Military Attache [sic] at Paris,
in which his rise was phenomanally [sic] rapid. At the outbreak of the
war in 1939, he held the rank of Colonel. He participated in the Polish
campaign as chief of staff of the infantry corps, and there-after was
given command of a division during the campaign against the Low Countries
and France. He commanded another infantry division in Russia, and in 1942
he was given command of a corps; in the same year, he reached the rank of
General der Infanterie [sic] (equivalent to a Lieutenant General in the
American Army). His outstanding combat record, which has won him the
highest German decorations, brought him to Hitler’s attention and
undoubtedly lead to his appointment as Commander of the Second Panzer
Army. In the spring of 1944 he was promoted to Generaloberst [sic]. Two
more of the defendants, Leyser and Dehner, now appear for the first time
in this case as corps commanders under Rendulic.
In Serbia another new face was introduced. General Hans Felber had
led troops in battle and seen occupation duty in France. Weichs and
Rendulic thought Bader too old and routine-minded for the requirements of
the new situation; he was relieved as Military Commander of Serbia and
replaced by Felber. The defendant Geitner, however, carried on as
Felber’s Chief of Staff.
Felber’s jurisdiction, however, was broader than that which had
been exercized [sic] by Bader. Just as von Weichs, as commander of all
the armed forces in the southeast was the superior of Loehr in Greece and
Rendulic in Croatia, so Felber, with the title of Military Commander
Southeast, was now made the superior of the German Military Commanders in
Greece and Montenegro and of the "Flenipotentiary Generals" in Croatia
and Albania. The Military Commander[s is faded] in Greece, beginning in
August 1943, was the defendant Speidel. Accordingly,
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in this final phase of the case, all of the defendants except two (List
and Kuntze) are involved.
Von Weichs, of course, had supreme authority over the entire
organization-over Rendulic and Loehr as tactical commanders, and over
Felber and his subordinate "Military Commanders". Geographically speaking
his responsibilities were far greater than those which had been borne by
List, Kuntze, and Loehr before him. He had barely arrived in the Balkans
when the Italian capitulation occurred, and he was immediately confronted
with the task of disarming and rendering harmless the Italian forces in
Croatia, Montenegro, Albania and Greece. At the same time, he had to take
over occupational responsibility for the areas which the Italians had
theretofore controlled.
B. The Italian Surrender.
The new leadership was on the defensive from the start. Sicily had
been invaded by the combined British and American forces in July. A
fortnight later Mussolini was deposed and the King appointed Marshal
Badoglio to conduct the war as new head of the Italian Government. But
in six more weeks, on September 8, 1943, the Italian armed forces
surrendered unconditionally. Under the terms of the armistice of all the
Italian armed forces were to cease hostilities of any kind against the
forces of the United Nations and to withdraw to Italy immediately from
all areas in which they were currently engaged.
The German High Command was not caught unawares by this
development. Italy’s defection had been anticipated, and when it actually
occurred, the Germans proceeded with synchronized swiftness to attack and
disarm their one-time colleague. The orders from Berlin were clear and
precise. Italian soldiers who wished to continue fighting on the German
side were to retain their arms, to be accorded treatment "completely
consistent with their honor", and to receive rations "based on those of
the Germans". Indeed, they even were to receive
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50% of the German pay corresponding to their ranks. German gratitude and
generosity to the "faithful" was boundless. Those Italians who did not
wish to continue fighting for the Germans were to be disarmed and made
prisoners-of-war. They, however, would not have to endure the long,
boring days of waiting in the barbed-wire enclosures that is the legal
fate of prisoners-of-war. Instead they were to be turned over to the
Plenipotentiary for Labor Employment and the Reichsminister for War
Production and Armament, so that their strength and skill might be fully
utilized in the German war production.
For those Italian soldiers who dared to obey the orders of their
own Supreme Commander and resisted German forces either actively or
passively, a more select fate was in store-the officers of all Italian
troop units who let their arms fall into the hands of insurgents or in
any way made common cause with insurgents were to be shot to death after
summary court martial; the non-commissioned officers and men of such
units were to be taken away for labor employment.
The Fuehrer’s order was put into savage execution. In a matter of
hours von Weichs had ordered its distribution to all tactical commanders
in the theater. In some cases the order was passed on in expanded form.
Rendulic, for example, gave more detailed instructions to his troops:
Should an incorrigible Italian division destroy its arms and supplies,
besides the individual "culprits" , one officer of the Divisional Staff
and 50 men of the division should be shot to death; any individual
Italian soldier selling or giving away his arms to civilians or
destroying them without explicit orders would be shot to death; any
Italian soldier arriving at his embarkation station without his weapon
was to be shot to death together with his responsible unit leader; for
every motorized vehicle made useless,
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one officer and 10 men would be executed. In a mater of days, fifty-one
hesitant Italian divisions had been totally disarmed by but seventeen
German divisions. However, at least two whole Italian divisions resisted,
while thousands of individual Italian soldiers, noting the treatment
meted out by the Germans to resisters and surrendered alike, took to the
hills to join the partisans.
The reports poured in-from the division to the corps, the corps to
the army, the army to the army group, and the army group to OKW in
Berlin:
On 27 Sept. 1943, from Split on the Dalmatian coast: "city
and port occupied, 3 generals, 300 officers, 9,000 men of the Italian
"Bergamo" Division taken prisoners; officers to be shot to death
according to the Fuehrer." 30 Sept. and 1 Oct. 1943: 3 generals shot in
split after summary sourt martial.; 34 more guilty Italian officers shot
in split.
From the 7th SS Division on the 29th Sept. 1943: "The Italian
General Fulgowi has been convicted for delivering arms to the partisans
and sentenced to death."
Ffom [sic] the XXIst Mtn. Corps on the 9th Oct. 1943:
"Operations against the Italian ‘Taurinesse’ Division concluded in the
main, reprisal measures carried out against 18 officers."
From the XXIInd Mtn. Corps on the 23rd Sept. 1943: "Gen.
Gandini and all his staff captured, special treatment according to the
Fuehrer order. The following day "Gen. Gandini and all officers have been
shot."
From the 100th Inf. Div. on the 1st Nov. 1943: "reprisal
measures are being taken against the 2 Italian colonels (the Ia and IIa
of the 9th Italian Army) captured near ‘505’".
On 13 Oct. 1943, from Von Weichs the Supreme Commander
Southeast: "Execution of general Roncaglis, Commander of the Italian
XVth Army Corps, ordered in case of further opposition".
This calculated slaughter of captured or surrendered Italian
Officers is one of the most lawless and dishonorable actions in the long
history of ar[m]ed combat. For these men were fully uniformed. They bore
their arms openly and followed the rules and
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customs of war. They were lead by responsible leaders who in repelling
attack were obeying the orders of Marshal Badoglio, their Military
Commander in Chief and the duly authorized political head of their
nation. They were regular soldiers entitled to respect, humane
consideration, and chivalrous treatment.
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C. Croatia
With the disarming and liquidation of the Italians complete, the
Southeast Command returned to the continued prosecution of its principal
mission of pacification. In Croatia the task of defeating the guerrillas
was alone a big order. To do that and quiet the civilian population in
addition was far more difficult.
To begin with, the puppet Croatian Government of Ante Pavelic was
of no help whatever. Its inefficient and poorly organized national
militia, led by Kvaternik, was unable to maintain order within the
country, let alone protect the vital German supply lines running from the
Reich through Croatia to Serbia and Greece. Even for the German troops of
the Second Panzer Army, it was a full-time job to keep the supply and
communication routes open. In an earlier period, the enemy had waged
guerrilla warfare; it was the only way he could fight, and the way which
suited him, his resources, and the topography of the country best. He
staged surprise raids on lonely German outposts or under-manned
garrisons, he mined bridges, derailed trains, cut telegraph wires, fired
supply depots, and exploded ammunition dumps. That sufficed in an earlier
time. Now after two years in the hills he was experienced and well
trained; the Allies were on the offensive and had supplied him with
weapons, ammunition, food and clothing; he was expertly led and
efficiently organized. Now he was a real enemy, a belligerent of major
proportions, and a foe to be reckoned with in terms of large-scale
operations and overall strategy.
To meet the challenge of the big and the new, the Germans had only
the small and the old. From the day in 1941 when the campaigns against
Greece and Yugoslavia had been declared ended and the front line troops
redeployed to the East, the Southeastern commanders had begged for
replacements and reinforcements. The southeast theater was continuously
under strength throughout the war. Yet always the same answer cameadditional troops cannot be spared from the decisive Russian front. But
not only were the troops in the Southeast too few; they were also of
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inferior quality. They included many reserve troops who were over-age and
jaded. Insufficient and inferior troops had been the German problem from
the beginning. In 1941 and 1942 they had met it the only way the heavyhanded Germans knew how to meet any resistance—by terror. In 1943 and
1944, as unimaginative and blindly cruel as ever, they would meet in the
same way.
The practice of seizing scores of hostages in each village in which
German troops were stationed or in the vicinity of which German troops
were operating was continued. In 1941 the Germans had taken democrats,
nationalists, and Jews as their hostage victims. Now that most of those
had been liquidated they were choosing "communists", "bandit suspects",
"bandid [sic] helpers", or relatives of "bandits" as security pawns
against attacks. How did one distinguish a "communist" from the rest of
the population? Only the SD, the Croatian police, or the village
quislings could answer that. If men thereby were victimized by spiteful
and gossiping neighbors, it was just unfortunate.
The pattern of terror and intimidation was simple. After the
Germans had entered a village, all of the inhabitants--old men, women and
young children alike--were summoned to the central square or market
place. From a sound truck a German officer would announce to the
assemblage that there were partisan bands operating in the vicinity. The
Germans wanted information concerning the size, location and leadership
of those bands, the number of men missing from the village, and the names
of strangers presently living in the village. Unless the inhabitants came
forward voluntarily with the desired information, other and more drastic
steps would be taken to procure it. When there were no volunteers,
priests, school teachers, small shopkeepers or farmers--sometimes just
every third, fifth or tenth man--were called out of ranks and loaded in
lorries for shipment to the division’s hostage camp at some distant
central collecting point. Whether to save one’s husband, father or son by
revealing that a neighbor’s brother had joined the bands or was absent
from the village was a difficult choice
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for those who remained. Sometimes men or women weakened. More often they
just stood there- some passive, others weeping, all hating.
The basic pattern of burning homes and villages was also continued.
Partisan bands moved from village to village, changing their bases of
supply and operations as the Germans advanced or retreated. As the
Germans advanced on a village there might be an exchange of fire, perhaps
a few shots by retreating guerrillas. That the villagers had not asked
the partisans to come, had given them food and supplies only under
protest, or were powerless to resist their intrusion was of no moment to
the Germans. The inhabitants would be evacuated, on foot to the rear.
Some of the aged would die en route; of the others some would be executed
as "bandit suspects" or "bandit helpers" after screening by the SD; the
remainder would be sent to the Reich for labor; the village would be
reduced to rubble and ashes.
Those severe retaliation measures served only to defeat the
Germans’ own purpose. Glasie-Horstenau in Croatia knew it, the defendants
knew or should have known it. After a few months in the Balkans anyone
with the slightest objectivity would have known it. Those measures were
military suicide, not military necessity. In spite of the hangings and
burnings-- indeed because of them--the resistance continued. With his
home and village destroyed, his means of livelihood cut off, his family
and friends executed, in concentration or hostage camps, or slaving in
Germany, there was little else for a man to do but take to the woods.
Completely without roots, immunized against fear and nursing a bitter
hate, he was excellent material for the partisan forces.
By mid-1943, after the influx of thousands of lonely, angry, and
displaced men, the guerrillas numbered in the tens of thousands. His
attention drawn to the tremendous labor needs of the Reich, Hitler, on 27
July 1943, issued a new order finally recognizing the magnitude,
importance and regular military nature of the warfare in the Southeast.
In order that more human material might be imported to the Reich to
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insure the necessary supply of coal, all "bandits" captured in combat
were no longer to be executed. Henceforth they were to be deported to
Germany by way of prisoner collecting points. Prisoners were to be
executed no longer-no because it was thought illegal or inhuman to
execute prisoners, but simply because their labor was now necessary for
the Nazi war machine.
In order to clear up any doubts concerning this unusually humane
Hitler order, the OKW issued a clarifying order, dated August 18, 1943.
Paragraph 3 of the succeeding order empowered any commander having the
rank of at least a Divisional Commander, "in cases of particularly
malicious procedure on the part of the bandits or their accomplices", to
issue precautionary directives not to take any prisoners, or to shoot
prisoners and the population captured in the combat areas. In his order
of 15 Sept. 1943, passing on this clarifying order, Rendulic said--and
for this he deserves the dubious honor of having "improved" on a Fuehrer
order:
1)
All operations against collective bands or against individual
bandits are to be executed with ruthless severity. The unit employed in
band combat is not to be satisfied merely to chase away the bands, but it
must attempt again and again to exterminate bands or at least parts of
them…..
2)
The severity of the fights against the cunning enemy often makes it
impossible to bring in prisoners without endangering one’s own men. The
precautionary directives under No. 3 of the OKW’s order below, not to
take prisoners, will frequently become necessary against the bands in the
Serbo-Croatian area. Should the individual bandits nevertheless be
captured alive by our own troops, they are to be treated in accordance
with the attached order of the OKW/WFST secret, dated 18.8.43.
What a thinly veiled invitation to the wholesale murder of defenseless
prisoners of war, of men who satisfied all the criteria prerequisite to
full belligerent status. Small wonder, then, that brutalized by such
orders, the common German soldier lost all sense of chivalry, all regard
for decency. As inexorably as night follows day, the issuance of these
criminal orders was followed by the reports of the enforcements:
Captured 31 partisans--27 of them were shot;
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2 partisans, captured during an attack on Bijela, refused to tell the name
of the Brigade or Division to which they were attached. After their
interrogation, they were shot;
18 captured partisans shot;
4 partisans captured--shot;
Communist courier hanged after interrogation;
100 bandits hanged for railway sabotage and for a surprise attack on police;
20 partisans hanged for an attempt to blow up a railroad.
You will read these and scores of similar reports until numbed by the
monotony of their tragic sameness, your emotions may well be incapable of
registering further horror and pite [sic].
Although a critical manpower situation in the Reich was responsible
for modification of existing orders respecting the treatment of captured
partisans, there was no similar practical excuse for a change in the basic
orders governing reprisal measures. The consistency of the German
retaliation rules runs like a steady red thread throughout this case. Those
rules, like the physical presence of Foertsch, lend consistent if appalling
unity to the periods of List, Kuntze, Loehr and von Weichs.
The already mentioned Rendulic order of 15 Sept. 1943 is as revealing
on the subject of reprisal measures as it was on the treatment of captured
partisans. It is not an exceptional order. It is, unfortunately, thoroughly
representative of every single man in the defendants’ dock. The order
states:
Attacks on German menbers[sic] of the Wehrmacht and damages to warimportant installations are to be answered in every case by the shooting or
hanging of hostages and the destruction of surrounding villages, which
latter is to take place, if possible, after the arrest of the male
population which is capable of bearing arms. Only then will the population,
in order to avoid reprisal measures, inform the German authorities if bands
collect.
Unless in individual cases different orders are issued, the rule for
reprisal measures is:
1 German killed 50 hostages
1 German wounded 25 hostages
Kidnapping of a German will be considered equal to killing a German
unless the kidnapped person does not return within a definite period.
According to the severity of the attack, 100 hostages may be hanged or shot
for each attack against war-
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essential installations. These reprisal measures are to be executed if
the culprit is not caught within 48 hours.
With orders of this nature outstanding, there could have been only
satisfaction, not surprise, as the routing, matter-of-fact reports came
in:
20 hostages hanged and 20 shot for railway sabotage;
As a retaliatory measure for an attack on an armored column 27 Chetnik
hostages hanged;
Arrest of a woman teacher in Kapela as a hostage, whose husband, a
Croatian captain, deserted to the bands;
Relatives of track attendant Petric, who left his post at 1800 hours,
will be shot if he fails to return;
The mass of the population of the villages of Paklenica and Vocarica
arrested as hostages and the villages burned down in reprisal for a band
surprise attack on Novska;
One village burned and 100 bandits shot as a measure of retaliation for
raid on railway southeast of Graconica;
In retaliation for a raid on a freight train southeast of Vinkovci, 21
bandit suspects taken from near the place of the raid and executed there.
Von Weichs knew of this and other of Rendulic’s orders. He knew,
too, of their precise execution--he was Rendulic’s commander, it was his
business to know. Dehner and Leyser knew of them also-it was they who saw
to it that the orders were carried out. It was their divisions, regiments
and battalions who did the shooting.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribnal*** will be in recess at this time until
1:30 this afternoon at which time this Tribunal will reconvene in Court
Room No. 2.
(A Recess was taken until 1330 hours).
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AFTERNOON SESSION
(The Tribunal reconvened at 1330 hours, 15 July 1947)
THE MARSHAL: The tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel may proceed.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If the Tribunal please, prior to the recess, you will
remember, we were discussing the final occupational period, the period
August 1943 to October 1944. We were particularly concerned with the
basic orders issued by Weichs for the whole theater, and with their
execution by Rendulic, Dehner and Leyser in Croatia.
Not until late December 1943, four moths after the inauguration of
the new Southeast command, did a major reorientation in theater policy
take place. Minister Plenipotentiary Neubacher, Ribbentrop’s top
political advisor for southeaster[sic] Europe, had long worried over the
boomerang effect of the German occupational terror. After conferences
with Weichs and his army commanders, it was agreed that "the reprisal,
penal and revenge measures practed[sic] up to now must in the future,
take into account the new political objectives." In cases of attacks or
acts of sabotage, the new principle was "to seize the perpetrator himself
and to take reprisal measures only as a second course, if through
reprisal measures the prevention of future attacks is to be expected." Up
until now the hangings and burning admittedly had occurred first, and the
search for the guilty only later. A reversal in technique was a tribute,
not to justice, but to military expediency.
This order of the Supreme Command Southeast, dated 22 December
1943, is a remarkable document in many ways. It rescinded all previous
orders concerning hostage quotas. But though reprisal quotas were no
longer to be fixed, they were not at all prohibited. Rather the extent of
the reprisal measures was to be "established in advance in each
individual case." The order is unique also because of tis [sic] twisted
and inconsistent language. It reads in part as follows:
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The procedure of carrying out reprisal measures, after a surprise
attack or an act of sabotage, at random on persons and dwellings in the
vicinity, close to the seene [sic] of the deed, shakes the confidence in
the justice of the occupying power and also drives the loyal part of the
population into the woods. This form of execution of reprisal measures is
accordingly forbidden. If, however, the investigation on the spot reveals
open or concealed collaboration or a conscientiously passive attitude of
certain persons concerning the perpetrators, then these persons above all
are to be shot as bnadit[sic] helpers and their dewellings[sic]
destroyed….
If such people as are guilty can not be found, those persons must be
resorted to who, without being connected with the actual deed,
nevertheless are to be regarded as co-responsible.
Why should persons not connected with the actual deed "nevertheless
be regarded as co-responsible"? When superior orders are so
incomprehensible and so in need of lower-level clarification, it is not
surprising to find one of Renudulic’s Division commanders, writing to his
troops in the following simple, straightforward, understandable language:
All is right which leads to success. After three full years of war in the
Balkans each commander knows what is best.
Not because of the new policy directive, but rather because of
tactical considerations arising out of the regular military nature of the
current war in the Southeast, there was a noticeable change in the
Croatian picture in the early months of 1944. The change was not so much
a decline in the quantum of crime committed by the German troops there as
it was a shift in emphasis from one type of crime to another. The number
of hostage hangings may have decreased, but in their place were the many
raids on partisan concentrations, followed, after all military operations
were ended by the deliberate burning of partisan hospitals and medical
supplies and, on occasion, by the merciless execution of their sick and
wounded patients. With periodical "purge actions" and "punitive
expeditions" throughout 1944, for example, units of the " Prinz Eugen"
and "Devil’s" Divisions, both subordinate to Rendulic, went on a rampage
of blood and cruelty that can only be duplicated in history by the orgies
of Genghis Khan. A dozen or more inoffensive Dalmatian villages were
burned and plundered. Three villages were destroyed and more than 800 of
their inhabitants massacred on a single day.
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The troops machine-gunned crowds which they, themselves, had assembled,
they looted the dead and then half burned the bodies on giant funeral
pyres, they poured gasoline on live victims and then set them on fire,
they raped and they pillaged and they slaughtered. What else could be
expected of men brutalized and icited to crime by the ruthless orders of
ruthless commanders?
Then there were the deportations to slave labor in the
Reich.Worried by the threat of an Allied invasion across the Adriatic
Sea, but more anxious about the continuous thrusts of Tito’s National
Army of Liberation and by the labor needs at home, scores of islands and
thousands of square miles of Dalmatia and Croatia were completely
evacuated of all their inhabitants by the Second Panzer Army. Mixed
Croate-German—
THE PRESIDENT: May I interrupt just a minute. We need a short
recess in order to fix the sound system.
(Short recess takan[sic])
THE PRESIDENT: I am informed that the English was coming over Channel 3
and the other language over another channel. The English is now coming
over 2, so you will kindly watch and see that you are getting it on your
right dial. And the German is on 3.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Mixed Croate-German commissions rounded up all
able-bodied men between 17 and 40 and gave them their choice of being
drafted into the Croatian Army or joining strongly guarded labor
battalions building fortifications. and coastal defenses, bother
alternatives which meant fighting on the side of those who would keep
them in bondage. Altogether, between 150,000 and 200,000 Croates were uprooted from their homes and villages and transported to district and
regional collecting camps from which they were later screened-the weak to
remain in local concentration camps and all the strong to labor in
Germany. In one single action alone, Operation "Panther", more than 6,000
persons were deported to the Reich for labor. Old men, women, nursing
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children, all had to go, wearing only the clothes they had on and taking
with them only what they could carry. And always, as an area was combed,
several groups of the SD were asked to accompany the army to "clean up"
in its rear. To "clean up"-- a polite expression for political, racial
and ideological murder. So widespread were the evacuations, and so
wholesale the deportations, that even the supine Croatian Government
portested[sic] in their quick and arbitrary manner that the Germans were
deporting hundreds whose loyalty to the Pavelic Government and the German
occupation was above suspicion.
Hangings—of hostages, "communists", "bandit helpers", "suspects";
executions- of prisoners, civilians, "anti-Germans", "unreliables";
burnings—of homes, villages and towns; punitive expeditions and "purge
actions"; mass evacuations and deportations to slave labor-that was the
answer of Rendulic, Dehner and Leyser to the problem of Croatian
pacification.
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If Croatia under the aegis of Rendulic was an operational charnel
house, then Serbia under Felber and Geitner was an administrative
extermination camp. In no other country did the machinery for murder
operate with such chain-like precision.
With impartial ruthlessness and severity, Felber and Gitner
liquidated both D.M’s and Partisans, depending upon the political
affiliation of the group to which the Germans believed the perpetrators
of the hostile acts belonged. They hanged and shot in incrediable [sic]
quantities, reflected in their dialy and monthly reports to von Weichs:
2 September 1943: "450 communist suspects ordered to be shot in course of
operation in area Leskovac";
29 September 1943: "10 D.M. hostages and shot to death in Jagodina for
the murder of the district supervisor";
4 October 1943: "283 D.M. hostages and 42 communists shot to death in
Cacak on 1 October in reprisal for a number of attacks in the area of
F.K. 610 during which German and Bulgarian members of the Wehrmacht were
killed.";
17 October 1943: "In retaliation for attack on German customs and police
patrol, 100 D.M. in the district of F.K. 810 and 150 communist hostages
in Belgrade shot to death;"
29 October 1943: "In reprisal for the attack on two German soldiers by
D.M. Chetniks near Tejika on 17 October, for a further attack on 21
October near Gr. Milanovac, and for the attack on barges on the Danube
near Izlaz on 26 October, 150 D.M. followers were shot;"
29 October 1943: "As revenge for the surprise attack on a cattle
purchasing detachment at Sljivar 100 D.M. followers and 200 communists
were shot in Belgrade";
29 October 1943: "As revenge for the surprise attack on the collecting
detachment of the 8th Auxiliary Police Battalion at Lelasnica 100 D.M.
followers were shot";
1 December 1943: "27 communist hostages shot in retaliation for the
attack on the train Negotin-Nisch".
Even after the order of December 1943 rescinding all hostage quotas and
decreeing a policy change in reprisal measures, Felber and Geitner
continued to execute in arithmetical ratio:
22 January 1944: "50 communist hostages shot to death for the murder of a
German police captain in Kragujevac";
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24 January 1944: "10 communists shot to death in Pozarevac in reprisal
for the murder of the mayor";
On 24 March 1944 in a memorandum addressed to F.A. 610, Felber approved
the execution of 10 "communist" hostages at the Krusevac airport, and as
late as 30 May 1944, he ordered the execution of 50 "communists" in
retaliation for the death of two German soldiers.
Such was the record of crime which Felber and Geitner compiled in Serbia.
Von Weichs knew the effect these massacres had on the Serbian state of
mind, and he knew that they were directly related to the problem of
pacification of the whole Southeast. He knew, too, that in a theater of
war without the usual operational zones and rear areas tactical security
and aministrative[sic] security were one and the same thing. Von Weichs
was law in Serbia as he was law in all the Southeast. He knew of Felber’s
and Geitner’s blooky[sic] work—he knew, he condoned, he consented, and he
approved.
For reasons of convenience and clarity in the statement of this case, we
have postponed our description of the German occupation of Greece in
order to treat it all together. Greece had been stunned almost into
quiescence during the first half of the joint German-Italian occupation.
Always a heavy food-importing country, Greece, with her outside sources
of supply cut off and her food stocks plundered by the Italian and German
occupiers, faced national starvation. Hundreds died in the streets of
Athens daily, children with the bloated bellies of undernourishment could
be seen everywhere, and between August 1943 and October 1944, the drachma
declined from one-three hundredth to one trillionth of its pre-war value.
With a population of slightly over seven million people, Greece lost an
estimated 300,000 of its inhabitants because of the foot shortage.
To a people accustomed to horses and carts, German mechanized might was
overwhelming. The military end had come with such speed
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that it took some time before the Greeks could even entertain the thought
of rebelling against half-tracks, panzers and airplanes. "But" as Lord
Dunsany says, "in three thousand years, freedom grows so hard that it is
like a piece of rock at the core of a mountain, that cannot be broken or
ground away, and cannot disappear ever." In the latter part of 1942, at
the time of Stalingrad and the Allied victories in North Africa, the
Greek resistance movement began to gather strength. In Crete, an all too
familiar note was heard as early as November 1942, when the German
commander General Brauer, instructed his commanders to educate the troops
"to show no mercy whatsoever to the civilian population."
As has been observed, up to August 1943 the greater part of Greece
was occupied by the Italians. But in November and December 1942 and
January L943[sic], Loehr’s reports to OKH began to contain an increasing
number of references to retaliation measures against sabotage and
guerrilla attacks in the German-occupied portions of Greece.
By June and July 1943, the situation in Greece had become
increasingly similar to that in Yugoslavia. Loehr’s reports to OKH are an
accurate barometer of the terroristic pattern
3 June 1943: "10 communists from a concentration camp shot in Larissa as
a retaliation measure."
2 July 1943: "4 villages burned down and 50 communists shot near
Litochoron for attack on German sergeant and blasting of railroad
tracks."
4 July 1943: "87 suspects shot while trying to escape".
5 July 1943: "50 Greeks shot in Melaxa for sabotage of cable lines."
Just as in Yugoslavia, literally dozens of separate resistance
groups at first arose in Greece. But after a period of merger and
consolidation, two organizations of major importance were discernible-General Zervas and his approximately 10,000 EDES troops in the Epirus
section of western Greece, and the ELAS units, 15,000 strong,
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in eastern Greece, the Peloponnessus peninsula, Crete and the islands.
To
methods.
hangings
Germans,

put down the Greek resistance the Germans tried the same old
Terror and intimidation, hostages and reprisal measures,
and burnings, had failed to pacify Serbia and Croatia. But the
never humane and seldom smart, knew no other course.

Greece during 1943 and 1944 was, like Yugoslavia, divided
theoretically into both operational areas and so-called administrative
areas, each with its own separate jurisdiction, organization and
personnel. For the efficient execution of their respective missions of
pacification and security, it was, of course, quite necessary that the
regular tactical troops of Felmy and Lanz should cooperate closely with
the district and sub-area police troops under Speidel’s jurisdiction.
This was achieved both by personal contact of the major personalities
involved and by the regular interchange of information, daily and weekly
situation reports, and the like. Generally speaking, the tactical troops
confined their activities to regular military engagements against the
organized partisan bands. Speidel’s police troops, and the other hand,
were concerned for the most part with the civilian population-seizing
workers for forced labor in the Reich, deporting Jews from Crete, Corfu,
Rhodes and the other islands putting down strikes, executing hostages in
retaliation for acts of the sabotage and the clandestine killings of
German police and quisling Greek mayors.
The orders of Flemy, Lanz and Speidel in Greece were similar to
thse [sic] issued by Rendulic, Dehner and Leyser in Croatia and by Felber
and Geitner in Serbia. When attacks on troops, installations and supply
lines continued, notwithstanding a previous 10:1 "hostage" quota, the
Germans, with their customarily inflated notions of their own worth,
promptly raised the quota from 50:1. But even the execution of 50
civilians in retribution for attacks by unknown persons did not
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completely satisfy General Lanz. On the 25th of October 1943, his 1st
Mountain Division ordered that the 50:1 arithmatical key be applied even
to German losses suffered in regular military combat with the
legitimately organized and uniformed guerrillas. After October 1943 the
out-moded 10:1 ratio was to be effective only for the less serious deaths
of such racial inferiors as a "pro-German Greek or a Greek working for
the Germans."
By mid-1943, the "Andartes", as the Greek partisans were called,
were an enemy to be seriously reckoned with. The Germans, however,
refused to grant full belligerent status to the Greek resistance forces.
Instead they waged war against he Greeks in 1941-420—by pressing the
native population into service on the side of the terror that was
oppressing them. They intimidated the inhabitants of peaceful villages
into giving information concerning the size and location of partisan
troops. They executed civilians in reprisal for the bombing of bridges
and tunnels, and for sabotage of communication lines. They labeled men
"Bandits", "communists", bandit suspects" and "bandat [sic] helpers" and
killed them without benefit of investigation, trial or even summary court
martial. In short, they resorted to every trick and device that a tyrant,
blinded by the fury of his own insanity, might resort to. The reports to
von Weichs and Foertsch tell the story of the harvest of the German
policy in Greece:
29 November 1943: "In reprisal for band attack on the road TripolisSparta, 100 hostages shot at the scene of the attack."
1 December 1943: "In reprisal for the killing of one German soldier in
Tripolis, 30 ‘communists’ were shot."
2 December 1943: "For attack on railroad bridge southeast of Tripolis 50
hostages hanged."
3 December 1943: "19 communist reprisal prisoners shot in revenge for the
murder and wounding of Greek police."
6 December 1943: "As reprisal for band attack southeast of
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Of Gythion 25 hostages shot."
21 December 1943: "In the area of Volos 25 bandits shot to death in
reprisal for an attack on motor vehicles."
25 Jebruary [sic] 1944: "50 hostages from the hostage camp at Tripolis
shot to death on 23 February in reprisal for the murder of an
interpreter."
9 March 1944: "In reprisal for strike agitation by communists 50
communists shot to death."
25 March 1944: "45 hostages shot in Corinth, 52 in Tripolis, 44 in
Sparta."
1 April 1944: "Speical [sic] train Athens-Salonika hit mines. One dead,
14 wounded. Tracks blocked only short while. The execution of 70 Greeks
at the site of the incident ordered."
Lidice, the small Czech village which the Germans leveled to the
ground in 1942, stands today as a symbol of German savagery. In Greece
there are a thousand Lidices—their names unknown and their inhabitants
forgotten by a world too busy and too cynical to remember. Greece has
many small primitive villages with 500 to 1,000 inhabitants who live in
mud houses with thatched rofs [sic] that have been lived in for
centuries. There are, for example, the villages [sic] of the Peloponnes
peninsula which were leveled to the ground in December 1943 during the
notorious "Operation Kalavritha." Touched off by a report that "bandits"
in the vicinity had killed 78 German prisoners, trops[sic] subordinate to
General Felmy embarked upon a reprisal expedition that lasted for eight
days before their senseless bestiality had been satiated. Fourteen
villages were completely destroyed and their male inhabitants shot. 511
persons from Kalvirtha alone were executed. Whether the Partisans had
killed captured German soliders or not, there was no legal excuse, and
there can be no moral mitigation, for seeking [dot] wholesale and
indiscriminate revenge on the innocent.
Then there were the parallel tragedies of Klissura and Distomen. On
an April morning in 1944 partisan troops appeared on the outskirts of
Klissura and forbade the inhabitants to leave the village. On the
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afternoon of the same day, about two miles away, one German motorcycle
was attacked and two German soldiers killed. German reprisal methods
being well known by now, all the male population of the village fled in
fear to
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hide in the hills. Only ole [sic] men, women and young children remained
behind. About 4 p.m. [sic] that afternoon the 7th SS Panzer Grenadier
Regiment and Bulgarian Occupational Militia subordinate to its command,
both under Felmy’s tactical jurisdiction, threw a cordon around the
village, searched the houses unseccessfully [sic] for weapons and
ammunition, and called all the people together in the public square. Then
the killing and burning began. When it stopped, there were 223 victims
lying in the square – fifty of them children under ten years, 128 women
and the rest old men – Klissura was a mass of smouldering [sic] rubble.
The "blood bath of Klissura", as the Germans so appropriately
entitled their own report on the affair, was too much for Minister
Neubacher to stomach. Not because it was inhumane but because it would
have serious political repercussions, Neubacher immediately protested to
Weishs. He said:
"It is sheer insanity to shoot babies, children, women and
old people because heavily armed Reds had been quartered for one night in
their houses and had shot two German soldiers in the neighborhood.
The political consequences of such deeds may be very serious. It is
obviously easier to kill quite harmless women, children and old men than
to hunt down an armed band. I demand a thorough investigation of the
matter."
The investigation was ordered. The military whitewash of an SS unit
by a Wehrmacht Field Marshal came two months later when Weishs wrote to
Neubacher:
"The Greek witnesses cannot be believed. The village was
taken by storm, the inhabitants killed by artillery fire. There was no
retaliation action."
Just two months after Klissura, in June 1944, troops of the same
7th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment were involved in a similar massacre at

15 July-A-FL-15-2-Stewart (Int. Schaeffer)
Court No. V, Case VII
Distomon. From the Germans’ own lengthy report of the incident the
following facts appear. As a German company approached the village, 18
Greek civilians were seen. Although they did not fire on the Germans, six
of the 18 "were shot while trying to escape". The remaining 12 civilians
were arrested and taken along with the company, which continued on to
Distomon, remained there for several hours undisturbed, and then set out
on the road from Distomon to Stiri. About two kilometers from Distomon,
30-35 partisans, well-entrenched in ridges overlooking the read and armed
with an 8 cm. trench mortar that covered the entire area, lay in ambush.
Before the surprised Company could disperse and reorganize to return the
sudden Partisan fire, the enemy had gone, [sic
In defiance of orders restricting the initiation of reprisal
measures to commanders of at least division commander level, the company
commander returned his troops to Distomon to retaliate the villagers
because they had not previously disclosed the presence and position of
the "bandits". A report of a German Secret Field Police member, who was
in Distomon at the time, relates what happened after the troops returned:
"After the troops returned to Distomon, the 12 prisoners who were taken
back were shot dead in the market place as a reprisal measure.....[sic]
Subsequent to that, all people present in Distomon were shot
dead wherever they happened to be. At that time, I was at the market
place and was looking after our wounded interpreter. As far as I
observed events, 60 to 70 persons – men, women and children – were killed
in the vicinity of the market place. As far as I could see it, all were
shot dead. I did not see inhabitants being killed in any other way, i.e.
beaten to death by rifle butt, or by pouring gasoline over them and
setting them on fire."
Why were the 12 arrested Greek civilians killed? What had they to
do with the subsequent action by the "Andartes"? Why were 270 inhabi-
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tants of Distomon killed? What was their crime? Why did the Secret Field
Police member feel obliged to say that he had not seen any inhabitants
"killed in any other way, i.e. beaten to death by rifle butt, or by
pouring gasoline over them and setting them on fire"? Was that the usual
method of executing retaliation victims?
Again Neubacher was dismayed by the political, not the moral,
insanity of such actions. And again he protested – not to Himmler,
although SS troops were once more involved, but to Weishs, the omnipotent
master of the Southeast, the Commander of Wehrmacht and SS troops alike.
This time the investigation was more lively, for it revealed that the
regiment to which the company involved was subordinate had knowingly
issued a false official combat report of its action against Distomon.
According to the regimental report the 18 Greek civilians opened fire
upon the company as it was approaching Distomon and were "shot while
trying to escape", while Distomon itself was taken only after a hard
battle followed by a mopping-up operation.
From a sheer internal military standpoint, the SS company commander
had not only violated orders regarding the initiation of reprisal
measures. He has also deliberately issued a false official report. But
convinced that the "competent authorities would also subsequently have
ordered reprisal measures against Distomon which would have necessitated
sending at a later time a strong mission with corresponding high fuel
consumption" and believing that the company commander’s procedure was
"merely a transgression against formality and corresponded to a natural
soldierly feeling", the regiment requested permission to handle the
matter "by disciplinary proceedings only". General Felmy, the corps
commander involved, consented to the regimental request, and Field
Marshal Weishs agreed. Neubacher was informed. The case was closed.
The events of Distomon merit this somewhat detailed account because
in this single tragedy there is presented in microcosm the evil
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of the German army in Greece and in the whole Southeast during four years
of ruthless occupation. It gives good insight, for example, into the
mental processes of a young German officer of company grade, completely
devoid of any notions of decency and honor, thoroughly corrupted by the
regulations, directives and orders handed down by his superiors, [sic] It
reveals precisely how war in the Southeast was fought, how the peaceful
population was drawn into the struggle, what a reprisal action
specifically entailed. It indicates how little the top military
authorities did to humanize the already existing techniques and methods
of anti-partisan warfare, how lax they were in disciplining their own
troops, how they shielded the guilty. Finally, it gives the lie to one of
the most important single myths that the Wehrmacht seeks desperately to
perpetuate – that the terrible crimes of troops in the field were
committed by SS units over whom the Wehrmacht had no power or control,
and that Wehrmacht commanders constantly and vigorously protested to
higher authorities against the undisciplined excesses of the SS troops.
Weichs knew the inhabitants of Klissure had been killed in a reprisal,
not a combat, action by the same SS unit which later was involved at
Distomon. He not only did not remove the commanders responsible for that
atrocity before they could repeat the same criminal performance at
Distomon, but he lied to Neubacher in order to shield it from criticism.
During the spring and summer or 1944 both the tactical commans
[sic] of Felmy and Lanz and the administrative organization of General
Speidel worked feverishly and desperately to postpone the bitter end. The
order of 14 August 1944 of General Friedrich Wilhelm Mueller, Commanding
General on the island of Crete, is representative of the attitude that
prevailed:
"Numerous attacks on German vehicles require vigorous
counter measures to demonstrate to the Greek people that we are masters
on the island. Consideration for innocent people cannot be shown any
more."
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Although they knew the war was irretrievably lost, the Southeast
Command continued to hang and burn and deport, and as always the Germans’
own reports tell the story:
6 April 1944: "In reprisal for an attack by bandits during battalion roll
call, killing 4 and wounding 11, 150 persons suspected of belonging to
bands were shot in Verria."
23 April 1944: "In Tripolis 12 communists shot in reprisal for a
murdered Gendarme."
30 April 1944: "60 communists shot in Athens as further reprisal measures
for attack on police officer."
30 April 1944: "200 Greeks will be shot to death as a reprisal measure
for the killing of Gen. Krech and his escort detachment."
1 May 1944: "In reprisal for attack on the truck convoy of the 41st
Fortress Div. in the southeast Peloponnesus area, 335 communists and band
suspects shot to death.
10 May 1944: "In the Boestia area, in reprisal for an attack on vehicles
on 26 April 1944, an additional 100 hostages are being shot in Athens."
In May and June 1944: "1600 Jews deported from Corfu and 350 Jews from
Crete."
From 1 May to 1 June 1944: "1747 laborers sent to the Reich in three
transports. Compulsory deportation to the Reich, particularly from the
Peloponnesus, will take place soon."
From 16 June to 15 July 1944: "600 men ready for shipment
from the
Peloponnesus for employment in the Reich. Transport will take place in a
few days for ‘Reichswerke Hermann Georing’ iron ore mines."
13 July 1944: "50 communists hanged in retaliation for attack on two
German officers."
31 July 1944: "Line repair detachment attacked by band west of Agrinion,
8 dead, 14 wounded, Reprisal measures – 71 communists shot."

15 July-A-BK-16-1-Stone (Int. Schaeffer)
Court V, Case 7.
10 August 1944: "F.K. 817 reports 50 communists shot at scene of
incident at Manara in reprisal for band attack on Athens-Thebes road."
5 August 1944: "Railroad sabotage on train Corinth-Tripolis. Seven cars
derailed. No losses of our own. In reprisal 18 hostages who had been
taken along were shot."
26 August 1944: "18 communists shot in Athens in reprisal for German
soldier shot from ambush."
23 August 1944: "During mopping-up operations near east Messara, Crete,
191 persons suspected of being bandits shot, 1 village destroyed, 1500
civilians being resettled."
5 September 1944: "In retaliation for raid on truck convoy, 186
suspects[s] shot to death."
In August and September 1944: "13 villages destroyed in retaliation for
the kidnapping of Lt. Gen. Kreipe."
Finally, in October 1944, the end came. Threatened from the West by
combined Anglo-American forces and from the East by the Soviet armies,
German troops were withdrawn from the southeast to defend a crumbling
Reich. British units landed on the mainland; Elas and Edes troops came
down out of the hills. After four long and difficult years under the Nazi
yoke, Greece was starving and destitute. But proud and courageous as
always, Greece was at last free to resume her own national destiny.
The generals of the Southeast Command went home, were re-assigned,
surrendered. Twice in 25 years mere readiness for war had been
insufficient. As had happened once before, the Balkans had proved to be
an [A]chilles heel to German aggression. The generals were never able to
understand why – but strong, independent peoples accustomed to hardship,
innured [sic] to suffering, and born to freedom can "no more be broken by
tyranny than a diamond scratched by a sword."
GENERAL TAYLOR: Your Honor, I desire to turn next to the charges ["r" is
typed over "n"] concerning devastation and deportation in Northern
Norway. These are the charges embodied in the first specification
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of Count Two of the indictment, and
to examine them we must
turn our attention from
the Balkans to the northernmost part of the
European mainland – the province of Finnmark in northern Norway. These
charges concern only the defendant Rendulic.
Even
since the initial attack against Russia, the
German 20th Mountain Army had been situated in the northern part of
Finland, holding Petsamo and threatening Murmansk and the railroad line
from Murmansk south to Leningrad, one of the two
main avenues for the weapons and supplies which America and Britain
were sending to the Soviet Union. This army had been
commanded, since January 1942, by Generaloberst Edward Deitl, who
met his death in an airplane crash in June, 1944. Rendulic
was chosen to succeed him, and arrived in Finland in August. The order
of battle of the 20th Mountain Army, predominantly
comprised of mountain troops, is shown in chart "G" of the prosecution's
pamphlet.
Rendulic's arrival in Croatia in August,
1943, had been followed almost immediately by the collapse of Germany's
Italian ally, now he was to encounter a parallel situation in
Finland. On the fourth of September, 1944, the Finns
capitulated to the Soviet forces, and demanded that the Germans
promptly withdraw their troops from Finland. Rendulic decided to fall
back across the northwestern Finnish frontier into northern Norway.
The region in which this retreat took place is shown in map "E" of
the prosecution's pamphlet. The northernmost province of Norway is
known as Finnmark, and the province just to the south as Troms.
Including a nomad population of Laplanders, the population of this area
numbers approximately 62,000, most of whom live in small ports and
villages along the heavily indented coastline, and make their living as
fishermen, it is a very wintry and isolated region; there are no
railroads, and the only communication with southern Norway

15 July-A-BK-16-3-Stone (Int. Schaeffer) <
Court V, Case 7.
is by sea or by the single road along
the coast known as Route 50.
Rendulic began his
retreat in Septemb er[sic], 1944. The two northernmost
corps of his army were the XIX Mountain Corps under General Ferdinand
Jodl (brother of the Jodl who was a defendant in the International
trial) and this corps was in the extreme north near Petsamo; the other
was the XXXVI Mountain Corps, about 100 kilometers to the south of
Jodl's unit. It was the troops of these two corps that were chiefly
concerned in the activities which form the basis of the charges in the
indictment. By the latter part of October, part of these troops had
been withdrawn westward from Petsamo through Kirkenes and were resting
around the village of Tana, and others to the south were making their
way out of Finland by the more southerly route shown on the map which
joins Route 50 near Porsanger-Halvoya. The darkness of the northern
winter was rapidly settling in. It was very cold, and there was more
than enough snow. The advancing Soviet troops had kept contact with the
Germans as far as Tana. In order to make the Russian advance as
difficult as possible, the German troops had been systematically
destroying barracks and buildings and port facilities, end endeavoring
to persuade the Norwegian population to evacuate, in the area between
Kirkenes and Tana.
Late in October 1944, the German
High Command decided
that this program of
devastation and deportation should be much more
extensive and regorous [sic]. As a result, on 28 October 1944, the OKW,
over Alfred Jodl's signature, issued the following order to Rendulic as
Commander of the 20th Mountain Army:
Because of the
unwillingness of the north Norwegian population to
voluntarily evacuate, the Fuehrer has agreed to the proposals of the
commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territories and has ordered
that the entire Norwegian population east of the fjord of Lyngen be
evacuated by forde in the interest of their own security and that all
homes are to be burned down or destroyed.
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The supreme commander, Northern
Finland, is responsible that
the Fuehrer's order
is carried out without consideration. Only
by this
method can it be prevented that the Russians with strong
forc es[sic], and aided by these homes and the people familiar with the
terrain, follow our withdrawal operations during this winter and
shortly appear in front of our position in Lyngen. This is not the
place for sympathy for the civilian population.
************
It must be made clear to the troops
engaged in this action that the
Norwegians will be
thankful in a few months that they were saved from
Bolshevism, and that the barbarian methods of the air war against our
German country and her cultural shrines have brought a thousand times
more misery to our people if compared with the humane evacuation and
destruction of homes in northern Norway, which is necessary for our war
effort, and which, if it is not done, must be paid with the blood of
German soldiers.
The population, whose livelihood is
fishing, in northern Norway,
furthermore has
enough shipping space at its disposal to be able to get
out of the way en masse across the water. A large part of the small
Norwegian ships which are kept hidden at present can be used for this,
and can later also be used for our own transportation needs.
The danger of the formation of guerrilla bands on
the part of the Norwegians appears to be negligible since they can no
longer use the houses during the winter.
It was
claimed, in defense of Alfred Jodl, during
the
international trial that this order was unnecessarily far-reaching,
and that Alfred Jodl, by various subtle means endeavored to convey to
Rendulic that it should not be complied with to
the fullest degree1. If this be true, there is little evidence that
Rendulic undertook
to soften its effect in any
material respect. The order which Rendulic
issued
to his subordinate commands the following day follows very
closely the language of the OKW order and includes the following:
1. Because of the lack of
willingness of the north
Norwegian population to evacuate the country
voluntarily, the Fuehrer has ordered the compulsory evacuation of the
population east of the Lungenfjords in the interest of the security of
the population, which is to be

Alfred Jodl's contention in this regard is referred to in the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Vol. I, Trial of the
Major War Criminals, p. 324.
1
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preserved from Bolshevism, and
that all houses be burned down or be destroyed. It is the
responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of Northern Finland that this
order be carried out ruthlessly so that the Soviets supported by
dwelling places and a population which knows the country will be
prevented from following our withdrawal with strong forces. Pity for
the civilian population is out of place.
**********
5. The following directions were given for
the Execution of the Evacuation:
a) The entire
evacuation area is to be emptied of people.
b)
Evacuated settlements are to be
destroyed unless
they are to be used thereafter by troops marching
through (that is, at the latest by the rear guards).
c) The operation must be a
sudden one and the
officers of the Reichs Commissar of Norway must
participate, and Norwegian authorities must be harnessed for it; the
latter, however, only from the beginning of the operation.
d) The seized population is
to be led to the
nearest ports under military guard (also small ports
with docks suitable for cutters).
e) Local and
district commanders are to erect reception camps in or near these ports.
f) Men capable of working and
marching, and in
the western districts women capable of marching also,
are to be coupled to the marching units furtherest in front and to be
taken along.
g) Insofar as the population still
has small ships available, they are to be used for the deportation of
the evacuees under military cover!
h) All ships used
by the Wehrmacht (freighters end Army transports) are
to be loaded additionally with as many evacuees as possible.
i) Columns on Route 50 to be
formed only to an
unavoidable degree; invalids, women and children to
be assisted by loading them on trucks. Only men really capable of
marching to join the march columns!
************
Finally I request all offices concerned to carry out
this evacuation in the sense of a relief action for the Norwegian
population. Though it will be necessary here and there to be severe,
all of us must attempt to save the Norwegians from Bolshevism and to
keep them alive.
On November first, the Germans made
known to the population what was in store for them. Rendulic's
proclamation stated in part:
TO THE POPULATION:
The evacuation of a part of
northern Norway has
been rendered a military necessity as a result of
the treachery of a Finnish Government clique.
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The evacuation necessitates
the removal of the civilian population, as the enemy has proved that,
in those territories occupied by him, he ruthlessly and brutally forces
the civilian population to give him active assistance in achieving his
aims.
This means that no shelter
or means of existence of any kind can be left to the Bolshevik enemy in
the fighting zone. All such installations as housing accommodations, ["s"
typed over "comma"]
transport facilities and food
stocks must be destroyed or removed.
THE POPULATION IN
THESE
DISTRICTS WILL THEREFORE BE DEPRIVED OF THE
BASIS FOR THEIR EXISTENCE,
SO THAT IN ORDER TO BE
ABLE TO SURVIVE, THEY MUST EVACUATE TO THOSE
NORWEGIAN TERRITORIES WHICH ARE STILL PROTECTED BY THE GERMAN WEHRMACHT.
**********
HE WHO DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THESE
UNEQUIVOCAL INSTRUCTIONS EXPOSES
HIMSELF AND HIS
FAMILY TO POSSIBLE DEATH IN THE ARCTIC WINTER WITHOUT
HOUSE OR FOOD."
(signed) by TERBOVEN,
Reichskommissar for the Generaloberst,
Occupied Norwegian Territories.
(signed) by RENDULIC,
Commander-in-Chief 20th
Army.
This ruthless and in
large part unnecessary decision was carried out by Rendulic's
forces according to plan. Northern Norway, from Kirkenes nearly to
Tromso, was turned into an Arctic desert. Over 43,000 men, women, and
children - over two thirds of the entire population of an area about
the size of Scotland - were herded down Route 50 or crowded into small
boats. We may be sure that the official German report to Rendulic of
the manner in which the evacuation was carried out is not overstated. I
quote:
Some
untoward events,
such as.... the separation of men from their families
to be deported ...., the burning down of houses in the presence of
inhabitants even where an immediate destruction was not necessary, and
shelling of the locality Kjallefjord by units of the German Navy,
hindered the readiness of the population to follow the officially
prescribed way.
The prosecution will submit evidence
to show that the devastation and evacuation, at least in large part, were
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wholly
unjustified from a military standpoint and that under the spur of
Rendulic's admonition that his order was to be "carried out ruthlessly"
and that "pity for the civilian population is out of place", the
destruction and evacuation were carried out with unnecessary brutality,
resulting in the impoverishment of the entire population, in the death
of some, and the suffering of many thousands.
We will turn to the final portions of the indictment—those relating
to
THE MURDER OF CAPTURED "COMMANDOS" AND "COMMISSARS"
Two of the specifications in Count Three of the Indictment differ
from the others in that their scope is not restricted geographically to
southeastern Europe. These are subparagraphs "b" and "h" of paragraph 12
of the indictment. Both of these specifications refer to orders of
general application, issued by OKW and OKN and distributed generally
through the field commands of the Wehrmacht, which denied the protection
of the laws of war to two special categories of enemy troops, and
directed that they be executed if captured. These two categories were the
commando troops, which the British and later the Americans made such
effective use of, particularly prior to the invasion of France, and the
so-called "political commissars", who were regularly attached to unite
the Soviet forces and fought with them in regular Soviet uniforms.
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Firstly as to the commandos.
The order for the murder of captured commandos was issued by Hitler
through the OKW in October, 1942.1 It directed that enemy commandos were
to be slaughtered to the last man; that even if they surrendered,
nonetheless they were to be shot immediately, unless interrogations were
necessary, in which case they were to be shot thereafter.
The order was not a purposeless piece of criminality; Allied commando
Operations were proving alarmingly effective, and Hitler apparently
thought that this order would act as a deterrent.
The order was distributed to all three branches of the Wehrmacht,
and there is ample evidence that it was widely distributed and well known
throughout the German army. In all probability, all of the defendants
(except List, who had retired just prior to its issuance) distributed or
enforced the order at one time or another.
In July, 1944, the commando order was given a new and special
application in southeastern Europe. A new order from OKW directed that it
should be applied to the members of foreign "military missions" who might
be captured with the partisan forces in the Balkans. This new order,
dated 30 July 1944, stated:
In the areas of the High Command Southeast and Southwest, members of
foreign so-called "Military Missions" (Anglo-American as well as SovietRussian) captured in the course of the struggle against partisans shall
not receive the treatment as specified in the special orders regarding
the treatment of captured partisans. Therefore, they are not to be
treated as prisoners-of-war, but in conformity with the Fuehrer’s order
for the elimination of terror and sabotage troops of 18 October 1942.
We must not forget that to kill a defenseless prisoner-of-war is not only
a violation of the rules of war. It is murder. The commando order
required the commission of murder, and every German officer who handled
it knew that perfectly well. The signs of a guilty conscience are only
too clear in another paragraph of the order which I have just
read, which required that the distribution copies of it should be de-----------------1.
The circumstances pertaining to the commando order are summarized
in the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal. Vol. I, Trial of
the Major War Criminals, p. 228.
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stroyed after reading.
There is ample evidence showing general compliance with this order,
as was found by the International Military Tribunal which stated in its
judgment:
Under the provisions of this order, Allied commando troops,
and other military units operating independently, lost their lives in
Norway, France, Czechoslovakia, and Italy. Many of them were killed on
the spot, and in no case were those who were executed later in camps ever
given a trial of any kind. For example, an American Military mission
which landed behind the German front in the Balkans in January 1945,
numbering about twelve to fifteen man and wearing uniform, were taken to
Mauthausen under the authority of this order, and according to the
affadavit of Adolf Zutte, the adjutant of the Mauthausen concentration
camp, all of them were shot.
Secondly, Commissars:
Whereas the commando order was especially designed for and executed in
western, and later in southeaster, Europe, the commissar order was of
principal importance on the Russian front. Unlike the commando order, it
was not the result of, or issued in reply to enemy action. On the
contrary, it was issued and distributed nearly three weeks prior to the
initial attack on the Soviet Union. Its words reflect, not the
hurried decisions of men beleaguered, but the considered opinion of men
who had pondered the conclusions set forth.
The order was issued on 8 July 1941 by von Brauchitsch, as
Commander-in-chief of the Army. That the authors were aware of the
criminal character of its contents, is apparent from the restricted
distribution to instructions which it bore. It was "For General officers
only. To be delivered through officers only…..You are requested to limit
the distribution to Commanders-in-Chief of Armies or Air Forces,
respectively, and to inform junior commanders by word ofmouth". It
provided, in part:
When fighting Bolshevian, one cannot count on the enemy
acting in accordance with the principles of humanity or international
law. In particular, it must be expected that the treatment of our
prisoners by the political commissioners of all types who are the true
pillars of resistance, will be cruel, inhuman and dictated by hate.
The German troops must realize:
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1.
That in this flight, it is wrong to treat such elements
with clemency and consideration in accordance with international law.
They are a menace to our safety and to the rapid pacification of the
conquered territories.
2.
That the originators of the Asiatic barbaric methods of fighting
are the political commissars. They must be dealt with promptly and with
the utmost severity.
Therefore, if taken while fighting, they are offering resistance and they
must, on principle, be shot immediately…..
....Those commissars will not be recognized as soldiers; protection
granted to prisoners-of-war in accordance with international law will not
apply to them. After having been segregated, they are to be dealt with.
When the defendant Weiche received this order as Commander-in-Chief of
the Second Army, he was not in combat but in the quiet of a then secure
Germany. His army had just been withdrawn from the southeast, and he had
returned to Germany; his army was in reserve and was not committed in
actual combat until July on the eastern front. Weiche distributed the
order to the subordinate commanders in his Army, and they
in turn passed it down to the troops. The prosecution will introduce
evidence showing that others among the defendants also distribute and
executed this order.
The Second Army had been in the front line in Russia but a few days
when reports began to come in to the Weiche1 headquarters, showing that
the order had been carried out. Indeed, Weiche1 headquarters appeared to
have been especially interested in the effect which this order was having
in actual combat; on 9 September 1941, his Chief of Staff advised the
next higher headquarters (Army Group Center) that the commissars were
fighting tenaciously and setting a courageous example for the Soviet
troops. He further stated that there was no evidence that the Soviet
forces were taking any measures by way of reprisal.
Typical reports from the corps commanders in the Second Army to
Weiche Headquarters read as follows:
Up to 25 July, 3 commissars eliminated by the 293rd Division.
From 25 to 27 July, 4 commissars eliminated.
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This order, like the commando order, called for the deliberate murder of
prisoners-of-war. One’s private feelings about political commissars,
favorable or unfavorable; have absolutely nothing to do with the case.
They were regularly attached to Soviet units, they fought in full Soviet
uniform, and, as the documents show, they fought with great courage.
Your Honor, would this be a convenient time for a break? The
prosecution has perhaps another hour and ten minutes.
THE PRESIDENT: I guess we’d better proceed for about a half hour.
GENERAL TAYLOR: Before concluding. Your Honor, I made the
suggestion to inquire whether the translators still have enough German
pages left to continue.
************
mr. Frank advised me they have only five pages they have translated,
and with a break of ten minutes we probably would be able to get the rest
of the German up here so that we will be able to go through without a
break.
THE PRESIDENT: The court will recess for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken)
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THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: General Taylor, before you continue with your
opening statement, may I enquire – I started to say before you
conclued[sic] your opening statement, may I enquire as to whether or not
you will be able to conclude this afternoon and give us time for the
submission of these motions?
GENERAL TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor, we will be finished before four
o’clock?
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
GENERAL TAYLOR: I would like to explain, Your Honor – that the
responsibility for the delay in translation is mine and not the
interpreters. I did not give them this material until very late
yesterday, and they have done very well to get it ready by now.
Before concluding, the prosecution wishes to outline its views on
certain legal questions which are sure to be discussed in the course of
this trial. No doubt the Tribunal may desire a fuller discussion of these
matters at a later date, but we think that a few remarks at this time may
be of assistance.
Certain points may be passed over briefly. The defendants may contend,
for example, that the crimes charged against them were committed under
the compulsion of orders from their military superiors. As has been
stated, their own military law is to the contrary. Paragraph 7 of the
German Military Penal Code
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So far as the plea of mitigation is concerned, should any of the
defendants succeed in bringing themselves within the scope of this
provision, the prosecution will suggest that it has little, if any,
application to persons holding the high military rank of these
defendants. There may be room for application of this provision in the
lower ranks of the military, but if it is to be applied to
fieldmarshals[sic] and generals, the whole doctrine of responsibility for
the commission of war crimes would be absurdly limited and rendered
totally ineffective. And, as the International Military Tribunal declared
in finding Keitel and Jodl guilty.1
Superior orders, even to a soldier, cannot be considered in mitigation
where crimes as shocking and extensive have been committed consciously,
ruthlessly, and without military excuse of justification.
But there are a few legal matters which have a more substantial
bearing in this case. These include the principles of international law
and the qualifications of belligerents. We do not believe that these
principles will have any decisive bearing on the outcome of this
proceeding; no doubt there are many delicate and unsettled questions
pertaining to hostages and belligerents, but the defendants so
frequently, so deliberately, and so far transgressed the outer-most
boundaries of what might be justified or defended as not unlawful, that
in the final analysis no such difficult problems will confront us.
I will deal first with Hostages and Reprisals:
The concepts of "hostage" and "reprisal" both derive from relations
between nations, or between their opposing armed forces, and not from
the relations between a nation or its armed forces on the one hand and
the civilian population of an occupied territory on the other. This
circumstance is not infrequently overlooked, and perhaps accounts for
the lack of precision in much of the writing on these subjects. In war
time, reprisals are actions taken by a nation or its agents in order

1

Vol. 1, Trial of the Major War Criminals, pp. 291, 325.
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to prevent an enemy from continuing to violate the laws of war. Thus, if
on one side, hospital ships are constantly being attacked, or the
protective symbol of the Red Cross ignored, the other side in[sic]
entitled to take action by way of reprisal in order to dissuade the enemy
from continuing his lawful course of conduct. Retaliatory action so taken
may include actions which would themselves be violations of the laws of
war but for the circumstance that the acts were done as legitimate
reprisals. Reprisal actions need not be identical with the unlawful act
which gave rise to the reprisals, but they should not in quantity or
character, be out of keeping with or disproportionate to the enemy
actions which they seek to stop. Reprisals may, in some circumstances, be
taken against a civilian population of an enemy country. For instance, if
the belligerents are each occupying a portion of the others’ territory,
and one of them mistreats the inhabitants in a matter not permitted by
international law, the other belligerent might take similar action in the
territory under its occupational control. But in such a case, the
penalties would be inflicted upon the civilians of the enemy country for
the purpose of per suading[sic] the enemy government to discontinue an
unlawful course of action, and not for the purpose of punishing the
civilian inhabitants themselves. Indeed, it is basic to the law of
reprisals that although they are in a sense retaliatory, their purpose is
not revenge but correction of the enemy’s behavior. 1
The practice of taking or exchanging hostages is very ancient; its
original purpose was to insure the performance on both sides of treaties
or agreements mutually entered into. The hostages were in the nature of
a pledge offered to guarantee a certain course of behavior. In more
recent time, hostages have been taken not only to

1

Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. 2, pp. 51-52 (1920).
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secure the performance of treaties, but also to enforce the payment of
requisitions, to protect or secure the return of individuals held by the
enemy, and for other like purposes. It will be observed that, at bottom,
the purpose of taking hostages is to put oneself in a position where
reprisals can be taken if the enemy (or, in time of peace, the other
party to the agreement) does not follow a lawful or an agreed upon
course of action. It is for this reason that a distinguished author in
the field of international law has said "the whole question of hostages
is bound up with the question of reprisals."1.

1

J.M. Spaight, War Rights on Land, p. 469 (1911).
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Beginning with the France-Purssian[sic] war of 1870-71, and probably
before that, it has frequently occurred that hostages are taken from the
civilian population of an occupied territory, not in order to affect the
course of conduct of the government to which these civilians owe
allegiance, but in order to control the conduct to conduct [sic] of the
civilian inhabitants themselves. This practice has been most frequently
adopted by the Germans, for no other reason than that during the last
eighty years, they have been most frequently in the situation of
occupying the territory of belligerent adversary. However, other nations
have from time to time taken hostages for this purpose ,[sic] most
noticeably the British during the Boer War.
The practice of taking hostages from the civilian population of an
occupied territory in order to insure the peaceful behavior of the
inhabitants has been much criticized, 1 but is acknowledged as lawful by
the great majority of text writers and, in the light of actual practice
it certainly can not be considered as a war crime. But the taking of
hostages for such a purpose is not, strictly speaking, a reprisal at
all, because it is not "a measure which is especially aimed at the
enemy’s method of waging war and which aims to force the enemy
government or armed forces to abandon measures which are contrary to the
laws of war."2 Although frequently called a reprisal, such a taking of
hostages is really a "police" or "security" measure. There is no
opposing government or Military Commander with whom the occupying

Hyde, International Law, Vol. 3, pp. 1902-03 (1945); "While the taking of hostages by the occupant may, under certain
circumstances, operate as a reasonable mode of securing compliance by a restive population with a just demand designed to
promote the maintenance of order, occurrences in the course of World War 1 encourage the conclusion that it is also a weapon
likely to be employed by a despot to check interference of any sort with ruthless and cruel acts inspired by caprice."
1

2

Ascan Lutteroth, Der Geisel im Rechtsleben, p. 243 (1922).
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power can deal on belligerent terms. From both a military and legal
standpoint, the taking of hostages or any other kind of oppressive action
for the purpose of maintaining order in occupied territories must be
considered from the standpoint of the right and responsibilities of the
inhabitants under international law, and the probably effect of the
measure upon their course of conduct. Steps which might be quite
effective in order to persuade an enemy government
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to alter its course of conduct might be quite ineffective when addressed
to the inhabitants of an occupied territory, and vice versa. As Professor
Lauterpacht, Professor of International Law at Cambridge University and a
scholar who is both
distinguished and modern, has pointed out:1
.....the impact of the operation of reprisals is not as considerable as
would appear at first sight. In particular, it does not seriously affect
that most potent source of war crimes which originates in the lawlessness
and the brutality of the occupying State.
This brings us to the question whether, if hostages are taken to insure
peaceful and orderly behavior on the part of the civilian population of
an occupied territory, the hostages may lawfully be executed if violent
conduct by members of the population continues to endanger the security
of the occupying forces. The Hague regulations of 1907 do not contain any
express provisions concerning either the taking or execution of hostages
in occupied territory. They do provide, however, in Articles 43 and 46,
respectively, of the Annex to the Convention, that:
The authority of ligitimate[sic] power having in fact passed into the
hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his
power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and
safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented the laws in force
in the country.
Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private
property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be
respected.
And, if these quoted provisions are not governing, we must take full
account of the declaration in the preamble to the Hague Convention,
that:

H. Lauterpacht, The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes, printed in "the British Year Book of International Law",
p. 77 (1944)
1
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It has not, however, been found possible at present to concert
Regulations covering all the circumstances which arise in practice:
On the other hand, the High Contracting Parties clearly do not intend
that unforeseen cases should, in the absence of a written undertaking, be
left to the arbitrary judgment of military commanders.
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High
Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not
included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the
belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles
of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the
public conscience.
The majority of the text writers in the field of international law,
ancient and modern, have determined, either from the unwritten usages of
war, or by clear implication from the language of the Hague Convention,
that the killing of hostages, under the circumstances and for the
purposes with which we are here concerned, is unlawful, and that the
continued confinement of hostages ia[sic] as far as the occupying power
is permitted to go. For example, Oppenheim sanctions the taking of
hostages by the occupying power only "provided that he does not kill
them."1 The classical statement by Crotius that "hostages should not be
put to death unless they have themselves done wrong"2 is in accordance
ith[sic] the views of other old authorities and has been echoed in more
recent times not only by Oppenheim but by Garner3

1

Oppenheim, op. cit. supra, Vol, 2, pp. 241-242.

2

Crotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, Ch. XI, Art. XVIII, Sec. 1.
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J.W. Garner, International Law and the World War, Vol. 1, pp. 306-311 (1920)
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and others,1 As might be expected, in view of the German propensity for
occupying the territory of neighboring countries, and the sustained practice
of the German Army in recent decades, German scholars take the contrary
view, and defend the execution of hostages as a necessary measure in the
event of continued civil disturbances, dangerous to the security of the
occupying forces.2 A few English and American writers have expressed
agreement with this view and argue, theoretically rather than practically,
that there is a fundamental absurdity in taking hostages if they can not be
executed. 3
The military Field Manuals of the United States and England do not throw
much light upon this problem. The American manual states that "hostages
taken and held for the declared purpose of insuring against unlawful acts by
the enemy forces or people may be punished or put to death if the unlawful
acts are nevertheless committed," but in practically the same breath states
that "when a hostage is accepted, he is treated as a prisoner of war," and
that "reprisals against prisoners of war are expressly forbidden by the
Geneva Convention of 1929." 4 The British manual is not entirely clear
either, but it contains the declaration that hostages are to suffer
captivity, not death, if an agreement is violated. 5
Despite these conflicting views in years gone by, the results of German
practices with respect to hostages during the last two wars has led to more
definitive declarations in accordance with the opinion

4. Sec, e.g., Arthur K. Kuhn, The Execution of Hostages, in "The American Journal of International Law", pp.
271-274, April 1942.
5. Waltzog, Recht der Landkriegsfuehrung, Art. 46, Par. III; Lutteroth, op. cit. supra, pp. 264-267, where, however,
the author acknowledges that the majority view is to the contrary.
1. Hammer and Selvin, The Taking of Hostages in Theory and Practice, in "The American Journal of International
Law", pp.20-33, January 1944.
2. Rules of Land Warfare, pp. 89-90, (1940).
3. English Manual of Military Law, par. 461.
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which most authorities have always upheld. In January 1942, the
representatives of nine European governments-in-exile, in the famous St.
James Declaration, branded the execution of hostages as "part of a regime
of terror" and categorically described such executions as punishable war
crimes.1 The London Charter, in Article 6 (b), and Control Council Law
No. 10 in paragraph 1 (b) of Article II, both recognize the "killing of
hostages" as a war crime. The opinion of the International Military
Tribunal makes repeated references to the killing of hostages as a war
crime.2
The prosecution suggests to the Tribunal that the execution of
hostages, under the circumstances pertinent to this case, is quite
definitely and clearly a crime under international law. The provisions
of Law No. 10 are only binding upon the Tribunal, but are in accordance
with the views which most authorities in the field have held for decades
past. But in urging the rightness of this conclusion, the prosecution
does not rely principally on the weight of authority, however
impressive. On the contrary, our position is based squarely upon
practical considerations of military necessity. The fundamental tenet of
the laws of war, as we said at the outset, is that human life should not
be taken unnecessarily. Over the past decades, only the Germans have
adopted a general practice of executing civilian hostages in order to
maintain security in occupied territories. Occasional examples in the
military history of other western nations may perhaps be found, but
there is absolutely no footing, either in the authorities or in
practical experience, for the conclusion that the execution of hostages
is ever really necessary. And, if not, such executions are in flat
contradiction of Article 46 of the Annex to the Hague Conventions.

1

See Kuhn, op. cit, supra, p. 274.

2

Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Vol. I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, pp. 227-228, 234, and 290.
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The short and conclusive answer to this much-mooted question is that the
execution of hostages practically never achieves its intended effect. If
the practice is once adopted on a systematic scale, it deteriorates
rapidly into a barbaric blood bath. The officers and men of an occupying
force will always find it easier to take vengeance on innocent civilians
who can be readily rounded up than to track down the actual perpetrators
and bring them to justice; it is only human nature, though scarcely a
credit to it, that once the taking and killing of hostages is sanctioned,
efforts to apprehend the real offenders will be slackened, and repeated
breaches of security will be countered only by ever greater slaughter of
hostages. Furthermore, the execution of hostages, far from frightening a
rebellious people into submission, tends rather to deepen their hatred
for the invaders and provoke them to renewed outbursts.
Even the timid and quiescent will be driven to resist, not so much out of
patriotism, as because they are no longer sure that good behavior will
safeguard their own security. When hostages are geing [sic] executed at
the rate of 100:1, there is no security for anyone. If women and
children and old men of the most pacific disposition are liable to be put
away in concentration camps and eventually executed because of violence
in the surrounding countryside, they will soon feel much safer in the
ranks of the insurgents than anywhere else.
And that is just what happened in the countries with which we have been
chiefly concerned today. The truth of what I have just said should have
become apparent to the Germans within a matter of weeks after large scale
military operations in Yugoslavia had been concluded, It did become
apparent to some of them, but they were not listened to. As early as the
31st of July 1941, a German lieutenant colonel in Belgrade wrote a report
to the defendant List in which he said:
Though nothing is said publicly about the shooting of Jews and Communists
as reprisal for acts of sabotage, these shoot-
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ings have, however, made a deep impression in Belgrade. It is doubtful
whether the shooting will prevent a repetition of acts of sabotage. The
saboteurs are to be looked for in the camp of the former Serbian
officers, of the Cetniks as well as of the Communists, who have the
common interest of creating unrest in the country and stirring up the
population to boiling point against the occupation authorities. For
their purpose the shooting of people who did not directly participate in
the acts of sabotage is actually welcome.
One week later, another report from Belgrade stated:
Reprisal measures, as for instance the severity of the shooting of 81
prisoners collected haphazardly did not bring out pacification nor did it
serve as an intimidation. On the contrary, the feeling of being
plundered, chased away, or slaughtered with wife and child, either by
criminal Ustaschi people in Bosnia or Herzogowina, or by robber elements,
or to lose life and property as the casual object of reprisal at the
hands of the Germans, has embittered and made desperate the otherwise
quiet and politically indifferent and loyal parts of the Serbian
population, who are automatically driven into the ranks of some kind of
insurgent groups.
The German civil authorities in Belgrade were of the same opinion. A
report dated 20 August, 1941, by an official of the Ministry of Interior
to the Military Commander in Serbia, disclosed the following:
A German officer- a captain- was killed from ambush on the road
Arandjelovak-Topola, 4 kilometers from Arandjelovac near the village of
Banja on the morning of 16 August. The officer was going on duty by car
to Belgrade. The offense was committed by a Communist who has remained
unknown. This Communist had been lying in ambush in the cornfield and
had fled through the corn to the woods after committing the deed.
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Eleven young farmers working in the fields were captured and shot for
this murder by the Germans at the place of the incident, a state of siege
was declared for the entire district.
In order to combat Communist operations which had got out of hand during
the last few days, the German headquarters sent a notorized [sic] assault
troop which is at present going through all the villages, making arrests
and - due to ignorance of the situation- is killing innocent men, women,
and children. All this is done on their own initiative, without
inquiries and without any kind of close cooperation with the
Administrative authorites at the Gendarmerie, although such cooperation
is an absolute necessity for the combating of the Communsit action and
for exterminating the Communists in the woods. The District Office has
available reports from which the movements of the Communists could be
established and it also has at it's disposal all personal data of the
individual Communists. However, the German headquarters does not request
anything nor does it ask the District Administration for any information,
and is opposed to taking any suggestion;
The consequence of the procedure of the German assault troups will be
that a large number of innocent people will be slaughtered and that the
Communists in the woods not only will not be exterminated but will
increase in numbers. Because many farmers, even entire villages - even
though up to now they had no connection with the communists - will flee
into the woods only out of fear and will be received there by the
Communists. They will be provided with arms and used for combat and for
open revolt against the German Wehrmacht. This insurrection will develop
on a large scale and will have incalculable and terrible consequences for
the entire population.
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There was no lacke of these warnings. With respect to reprisal shootings
carried out in the town of Kragujevac, the local German commandant, a
captain, reported to the Military commander in Serbia: 1

It goes without saying that even those commentators who have defended the principle of executing hostages on the ground of
military necessity make no defense of the German Army's practice of this principle. See Hammer and Salvin, op. cit. supra. pp.
26, 27-28, and 32; see also Stewell, Military Reprisals and the Sanctions of the Laws of War, in "The American Journal of
International Law" (1942)
1
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According to my standpoint, shooting partly or completely innocent
persons from this city can have directly harmful effects. It is to be
expected that embittered relatives of those shot will not practice acts
of revenge on members of the German Wehrmacht.
Sabotage acts on drinking water and on the current temporary light
supply, as well as a large attack of the bandits against the city, in
which the units could suffer more losses than before, are not out of the
realm of possibility. Above all, the psychological effect will be
catastrophic. The residents of Kragujevac have expected of the German
Wehrmacht the elimination of the Communist danger and the aligning into
the new construction of Europe. With the methods used here, we shall not
attain in any case the winning again of the favorably-inclined elements.
Two years later, the same Cassandra-like prophesies are found in the
documents. No one can ever say that these defendants were not
warned. In July 1943, Glaise-Horstenau, the German PlenipotentiaryGeneral in Croatia, strongly admonished the German Air Force for reprisal
actions by way of bombing villages, because, I quote, Wit only forces
additional adversaries 'into the woods', and it does not help to pacify
the country, but is detrimental and shakes the confidence in the German
soldier of those parts of the population which are of good will". But
not until December 1943 did the German military leaders in the Balkans
even pay lip service to these truths. Finally, Loehr's order of that
month recognized that, and I quote:
"The procedure of carrying out reprisal measures after a surprise attack
or an act of sabotage at random on persons and dwellings, in the
vicinity, close to the scene of the deed, shakes the confidence in the
justice of the occupying power and also drives the loyal part of the
population into the woods."
But even this order was, in other aspects, so ambiguous that it did
little to change these stupid and cruel policies. The slaughter of the
innocent continued and the Germans reaped only a harvest of dragons'
teeth.
The second set of principles of international law which are worthy of
preliminary discussion at this time are those pertaining to the
qualifications of belligerents. Under what circumstances are combatants
entitled to belligerent status? Under what circumstances must they, if
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captured, be treated as prisoners-of-war, and under what circumstances
may they be treated as a meree [sic] armed band and disposed of by
summary execution? These questions are especially relevant to Count
Three of the indictment.
The Hague Regulations do deal with this question in Article 1 of
the Annex which provides:
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies,
but also to militia and
volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:
1.

To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;

2.

To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;

3.

To carry arms openly; and

4.
To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs
of war.
These requirements are traditional and generally accepted. To the
extent that captured partisans in Gr[ee]ce and the Balkans did not
observe then, we may concede that the Germans would have been within
their rights in denying them the status of prisoners-of-war and executing
them.1 But this does not mean that all of us here in the courtroom could
here and now form ourselves into a military company, choose a commander,
wear a distinctive emblem, carry arms openly, and obey the laws and
customs of war, and on that basis alone claim the right here and now to
wage warfare and the status of prisoners-of-war of captured.
Obviously, the members of an armed group can not claim the status
and rights of belligerents until a war has started. The determination
of the starting point of a war may sometimes present problems, but
ordinarily the far more difficult question is to ascertain when a war
has stopped. In accordance with "the laws of humanity and the dictates
of the public conscience", it is desirable that wars be stopped as soon
as possible, and under some circumstances it may be wise to adopt a

Except insofar as the provisions of Article 2 of the Annex, relating to the so-called "levy on masse" may have applied, and
except insofar as the Germans themselves, by commiting [sic] the crime of waging aggressive war and, in their own operations,
departing from the laws and customs of war, may have deprived themselves of the right to demand compliance with Article 1
on the part of the partisans.
1
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fairly rigorous attitude when major military operations have come to and
end, and declare that, after the signing of a treaty or armistice, the
inhabitants of the defeated and occupied country, civilians and former
soldiers alike, no longer have the right to carry on warfare and can not
claim the status of belligerents.
On the other hand it can be, and is, often argued cogently and with the
benefit of many examples from history, that nations can rise from
apparent total defeat, long after the capitulation of their own former
government, expel the invader, and ultimately achieve victory. As long
as there is hope and particularly if there are strong allied nations as
yet undefeated, true patriots of the conquered country will continue to
offer desperate resistance to the invader, no matter what armistice or
treaties may have been concluded with him.
The argument between the proponents of these two divergent
approaches to the problem has been waged briskly ever since the
representatives of the European powers met at Brussels in 1874 to
formulate a code of war. In general, the powerful countries with larges
armies have tended to favor strict qualifications for belligerent status,
and the smaller powers a very much more liberal set of rules.1 It goes
without saying that the Germans have been in the vanguard of the former
group of powers.
The International Red Cross has consistently sought to extend the
protection of the laws of war to the members of all substantial armed
groups who meet the requirements of Article 1 of the Annex to the Hague
Conventions.2 We can not, in this proceeding, settle this therny and
complicated problem. And we do not need to.

An excellent discussion of these questions is contained in Nurick and Barret, Legality of Guerrilla Forces in the Laws of War, in
"The American Journal of International Law", pp. 563-583 (July 1946.) See also I.P.Training, Questions of Guerilla Warfare in the
Law of War, in the same publication at pp. 534-562.
1

Rapport sur l’activite du Comite international de la Croix-Rouge en faveur des "partisans" tombes aux mains de l’ennemi,
Geneva, October 1946.
2
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To begin with, it will be quite clear that the war did not end in
Yugoslavia in April or May, 1941. Article 42 of the Annex to the Hague
Conventions states very clearly that:
A.
A territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under
the authority of
the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where
such authority has been established and can be exercised.
The second sentence quoted above is of special importance. No
doubt the Germans, had they so chosen, could have left sufficient troops
in Yugoslavia to establish their authority throughout the country. But
they chose not to do this. They were pre-occupied with the forth-coming
campaign in Russia, and pulled out their troops before hostilities had
been fully concluded in practical effect and while large portions of the
country, particularly in the mountains, were controlled by substantial
enemy forces who announced openly that they would continue to
resist. Whatever might be the rule in other circumstances, it was not
open to the Germans to sweep through Yugoslavia, evacuate the bulk of
their troops before their authority had been fully established, and then
declare that all future resistance would be considered a violation of the
laws of war.
Furthermore, the cause of the Yugoslavian and Greek resistance
forces was at no time hopeless, as events have been abundantly
proved. Governments-in-exile were promptly established, under whose
authority these forces continued their operations, indeed, long before
the end of the war, there was an enemy government within
Yugoslavia. Powerful allies of the Yugoslavs and Greeks continued to
maintain armies in the field and to assist the resistance groups.
Furthermore, if we look at the question as presented in the case
from a practical standpoint, we again discover that the case is not
nearly so difficult as it seemed at first blush. If resistance forces
consist only of a few small bands, whose activities are limited to
sniping and minor sabotage and who enjoy no support from other powers,
there may indeed be reason for denying them the status of belliger-
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ents.1 But there can be no reason for such a policy when the enemy
remains in large numbers, and fights in large units and with modern
weapons. To deny his troops the status of belligerents under such
circumstances will merely invite counter-reprisals against troops of the
occupying power, and a senseless war of extermination may ensue. Even
more important, such a policy will inevitably rally more and more
inhabitants of the occupied country to the standard of the resistance
forces. These very arguments were presented to Loehr and Leuters by
Colonel Heinz, Commander of the 4th Brandenburg regiment, in July
1943. Discussing the impossibility of capturing Tito and his staff by
orthodox military action, Heinz declared:
Such an elimination can only be achieved by former partisans in
cooperation with the
Brandenburg regiments.
The method followed up to now of shooting to death all partisans without
distinction,
could never be successful. Many became partisans by the combined
influence of several circumstances such as Ustaschi-Moslem-or Cetnikatrocities, want and starvation, terror and duress by other partisans.
They stay partisans because the way back is blocked by the German
orders. They have lost their country and their family, and so they fight
to their death.
Since the political conditions in Croatia are not improving, new
partisans replace those who are killed.
According to observations of my troop, it would have been possible to
win over a certain percentage of the captured partisans for fighting on
the German side, if their lives were spared and food, as well as their
return to their homesteads later on, were guaranteed.

But the distinguished jurist, Oppenheim, would not even agree with this statement, Oppenheim, International Law, Sec. 60
(1928).
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But the final and compelling answer to the question as it is
presented in this case is that the Yugoslavs and Greeks alike, even
assuming that they were completely conquered and their country wholly
occupied and under German authority, had every right to rise and defend
themselves by armed force because the German themselves so flagrantly
violated the laws of war. True it is that the inhabitants of an occupied
territory have responsibilities and duties as well as rights under the
Hague Conventions. If the occupying forces comport themselves lawfully,
the population is under a duty to remain peaceful and to refrain from
endangering the security of the occupation troops. If the inhabitants do
not fulfill these responsibilities, the occupying forces may take proper
security measures, including retaliatory action, to re-establish
order. But this works both ways. If the occupying forces inaugurate a
systematic program of criminal terror, they can not thereafter call the
inhabitants to account for taking measures in self defense. This is no
technical doctrine of "unclean hands", this is elementary justice and
common sense. What I have said nowhere appears in so many words in the
Hague Conventions, but it is in entire harmony with the purpose of the
articles, and I think no one will be heard to deny that this is the only
conclusion which is possible in accordance with "the principles of the
law of nationa [sic], as they result from the usages established
among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of
the public conscience."
In this case, ten thousand times ten thousand murders are charged,
and for murder there is usually a motive. When moved these men to
murder? Some of them religious, most of them well-educated. Some of
them may now realize what they did was wrong, but, had the war ended
otherwise than it did, I doubt that these things would have caused them
many restless nights. Their policy of terror was a military failure, and
an important cause of the defeat which has brought them to their present
plight. Yet these men are certainly not without ability and some measure
of understanding. Why did they not see what
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others see clearly?
I think that we can find the answer in two deep-seated
characteristics of the German military mind. Whether the characteristics
prove the inheritance of acquired characteristics, whether they spring
from undiscernible [sic] geophysical factors, or whether they are the
result of the curious and narrow training and indoctrination to which
German officer candidates are subjected, one may leave to the eductors
[sic] historians, psychologists and anthropoloigists. Today is the day
of the jurists, and today it is sufficient to observe that the
characteristics of which I speak and led these men, and others of their
caste, into crime.
One of these qualities is that their every thought and
impulse is geared to a world in which Germany is at war, in which Germany
is attacking and invading, in which Germany is conquering and
occupying. Lacking such conditions, their world is in a state of
suspended animation. Their martial fantasies have permeated German
scholarship and, by the latter part of the nineteenth century, had
thoroughly poisoned the most distinguished German minds. It was the
great German historian and philosopher Treitschke who declared:1
It is not for Germans to repeat the commonplaces of the apostles of
peace or of the priests or Mammon, nor should they close their eyes
before the cruel necessities of the age. Yes, ours is an epoch of war,
our age is an age of iron. If the strong get the better of the weak, it
is an inexorable law of life.
For the German militarist, other nations exist only to be conquered by
Germany. They persist in the illusion that other nations will benefit
thereby, and are often sincerely puzzled when their occupying armies are
treated coldly. This, too, we find Treitschke:2
We Germans, who know Germany and France, know better what is
Alsace than the unhappy people themselves, who through their
associations have lived in ignorance of the new Germany. We
them back their own identity against their will. We have in

1
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changes of these times too often seen in glad astonishment the immortal
working of the moral forces of History to be able to believe in the value
of a plebiscite on this matter. We invoke the men of the past against
the present.
With such a point of view towards war and the rights of German
conquerers, [sic] it is no wonder that German military leaders have
little or no respect for the laws of war or the dignity of peoples who
may come under their way. This is because they do not value, and in fact
are contemptuous of, the reasons which underlie those rules. "If the
strong get the better of the weak, it is an inexorable law of
life." This attitude shows only too clearly in the "German War Book" -the manual of usages of war on land, issued by the Great General Staff
(Gorss General Stab) of the German army. In the introduction to this
manual, we read:1
Nowadays it is not only the army which influencessthe [sic] spirit of the
customs of war and assures recognition of its unwritten laws. Since the
almost universal introduction of conscription, the people themselves
exercise a profound influence upon this spirit. In the modern usages of
war, one can no longer regard merely the traditional inheritance of the
ancient etiquette of the profession of arms, and the professional outlook
accompanying it, but there is also the deposit of the currents of thought
which agitate our time. But since the tendency of thought of the last
centyry [sic] (i.e. the 19th century) was dominated essentially by
humanitarian considerations which not infrequently degenerated into
sentimentality and flabby emotion, there have not been wanting attempts
to influence the development of the usages of war in a way which was in
fundamental contradiction with the nature of war and its
object. Attempts of this kind will also not be wanting in the future,
the more so as these agitations have found a kind of moral recognition in
provisions of the Geneva Convention and the Brussels and Hague
conferences.
In this case, the second marked characteristic of the German officer
caste come into sharp focus - their profound contempt, mingled with fear,
of the peoples of Eastern Europe. Again and again this emerges in the
orders to their troops and the reports to their superiors. We hear this
note in Keitel’s order of September, 1941, declaring that "a human like
in unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing". Von Weichs,
when he inaugurated the 100:1 ratio a few
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months earlier, responded to the same inner feeling. These orders, too,
are echoes of Treitschke, whose voice, spanning over half a century, is
heard to say:1
Each dragoon who knocks a Croat an the head does far more for the
Germans cause than the finest political brain that ever wielded a
trenchant pen.
What these men have never realized is that no caste, and not notion,
however mighty, can hold the world in contempt and set its laws at
naught. Their military downfall was due, in no small part, to crimes
such as those with which they are charged.
What we have said may explain, but it does not condone. We may try to
understand, but it is not ours to forgive. What these men did they meant
to do.
There are only 11 men physically present in the dock, but they do not
stand there alone. In a sense, they are hostages for the judgment which
history will pass on many others like them. But they are more fortunate
than the hostages we have heard so much about today. They will not be
punished for the crimes of other men. Centuries ago, Grotius wrote that
"hostages should not be put to death unless they have themselves done
wrong." That is the law of humanity, the law which they themselves are
charged with transgressing. And that is the law under which they will be
judged.
GENERAL TAYLOR:

This concludes the statement, your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: This, I take it, concludes the Opening Statement on
behalf of the Prosecution. The Prosecution having stated that this
concludes that portion of these proceedings, the Court will now give
consideration to certain motions which have been presented to it
concerning procedural matters, and a motion for continuance or
adjournment for a certain period of time. The first motion which will
receive consideration is that concerning the request for ferment of
these
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